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Where wisdom reigns, there is no conflict between thinking and feeling.
—Carl G. Jung

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Being faithful to one’s convictions is part
of integrity. Following principles, acting
with honor, maintaining independent judgment and performing duties with impartiality help to maintain integrity and avoid
conflicts of interest and hypocrisy.
—DOD 5500.07-R
The research problem outlined in this document represents the development of a Relative Ethical Violation (REV) model. The REV concept is inspired by and compared
to an existing similar model known as the Metric of Evil (often referred to as the
“Metric” in this document), which was conceived by Gregory Tackett of the U.S.
Army’s System Simulation and Development Directorate (SS&DD), enhanced by a
research team led by the author of this document, and further explored by the author
to provide a sound basis for development of the REV.
This chapter introduces the model concept and discusses the background and
motivation for the REV, inspired by both successes and identified gaps in the Metric
of Evil study and design.

1

1.1

Background
Individuals, groups, and societies make a massive number of decisions, both

large and small in scope, over a span of time ranging from a split-second to several
months—but with each and every one contributing to some causal chain. As such,
some decisions require careful, rational analysis. Some require unique, creative perspectives. Still others require decision support methods—among them may include
data analysis tools, advanced computer-aided design software, the wealth of tools
available to the simulationist, the knowledge of a group of subject-domain experts
amassed in a conference room, course of action analysis packages, or even models
specifically developed for decision support.
Some decisions are made based upon habits that we have developed over time
and require virtually no conscious thought—such as the sundry steps involved in our
morning rituals. For example, when commuting to work by personal vehicle, one does
not typically question—or at least agonize over—decisions such as whether to open
the door to the vehicle, step inside, sit in the driver’s seat, insert the appropriate key
into its ignition switch, and twist the key in order to start the vehicle and thereby
initiating the process of the morning commute.
Still others, however, greatly benefit from proper support and reliable guidance. A budding college graduate must choose among several newly-created career
opportunities. A jury must weigh evidence and testimony to decide the fate of a
defendant on trial. A military must evaluate its actions and reactions, whether diplomatic or forceful, for the sake of its country, its country’s allies, and, ultimately, much
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of the world. The means through which decisions are (or should) be made varies with
the domain of application and with the potential consequences involved—both in the
practical and in the abstract sense.
Decision support methods, especially those rooted in game theory, tend to rely
heavily upon strategy and rational cause-and-effect. As such, they have interesting
intellectual contributions—for example, they have led researchers to completely solve
(to force a tied or winning outcome) games such as tic-tac-toe, Connect Four, and
checkers. These tools also drive the design of the personal vehicle behind the morning commute; and, more generally, they help assess, visualize, and clarify tradeoffs
between various engineering design attributes. They also saw heavy use in military
operations, most notably during World War II and the Cold War. During the Cold
War, for example, they drove the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, the
conclusion that the United States and the Soviet Union would face annihilation if one
were to launch a full-scale nuclear assault on another—which led to nuclear deterrence
on both sides.
However, these rational, tangible problems are typically much easier to solve
than ones rooted in the philosophical, visceral, or ethical, which easily evade a
straightforward, logical grasp.
For example, if acting purely rationally, decision-makers would welcome a
greater number of options and alternatives from which to choose, since these would
provide opportunities to find the best possible outcome. In practice, however, having
a larger number of choices—whether of flavors of jam, health insurance companies, or

3

wall posters—can cause a person to choose less “optimally,” whether due to “analysis
paralysis,” “buyer’s remorse,” other psychological factors [66].
Traditional decision models also struggle with, for example, the ultimatum
game experiment. In this experiment, one player decides how to divide a sum of money
between him/herself and another person; if the other player declines the division, then
neither gets any money. If the players in this game were purely rational, and if they
considered only the money involved, the first would opt to keep most of the money
and give a small fraction (perhaps a penny) to the second, concluding that the second
player would accept the offer because he/she would also gain—even if minimally—
and the second player would, in turn, anticipate this action from the first. However,
psychological concepts such as fairness do easily not factor into this analysis—the
second player can (and typically does) reject this offer if he feels slighted or unfairly
treated, or the first may offer a larger-than-optimum share to the second player out
of a sense of empathy.
To adequately model these games and their players, the analyst must consider
that players seek not only to maximize jam flavor, insurance coverage, or money
earned in a partnership. In reality, players also seek to optimize relatively intangible factors—they may wish to minimize the portential personal for remorse and
disappointment, or they may seek to enforce interpersonal, ethical principles such as
fairness or empathy.
Ethical concerns now permeate modern military operations. Militaries now
contend with asymmetric warfare, counterinsurgency, and nation-building [54]; relatively simple force-on-force conflicts, which had been guided by more typical decision
4

support tools of the kind discussed, are becoming much less relevant. Due to the complex nature of the issues now facing military decision-makers, a more comprehensive
picture—one that encompasses the ethical implications of military actions—needs to
be developed to facilitate sound decision-making.
The nascent field of “machine ethics” involves the design and development
of decision support models that facilitate ethical decision-making. Typically, these
models use sets of rules, attributes, consequences, or principles associated with potential courses of action to provide suggestions, to guide the user through the ethical
decision-making process, or to suggest an ethically sound action.
Previously, a model called the Metric of Evil was designed to help resolve the
types of problems now facing military decision-makers. As a thought experiment
conceived in a research directorate within the U.S. Army, it was later funded by
the same for further development into a more robust decision support model. Since
military commanders often deal with difficult ethical choices, the Metric focuses on
the ethics behind military courses of action, suggesting the “lesser of two evils” of a
pair of actions. In fact, true to its name, the Metric outright attempts to capture
evil —as “intentional or anticipatable harm” [54], encoded as a set of consequences
weighted by relative ethical significance. The funded enhancement of the Metric
proved hopeful and suggested potential for the concept—it was successfully calibrated
to match assessments of experts in both the subject domain (military affairs) and the
ethical domain. However, its consequences-based approach raised questions from
expert participants—and from researchers involved in the enhancement study.

5

This dissertation discusses the research and development of the Relative Ethical Violation (REV) model, which provides another perspective on ethical harm. The
Metric serves as a precursor to this model. The research, design, development, and
experimentation behind this model is heavily influenced by the procedure used in the
original Metric research (as outlined in [54]). Moreover, its goal is similar to that of
the Metric—to assess actions in order to help guide ethical decision making, with primary focus on the military realm. However, it places its focus on the ethical principles
associated with actions rather than their tangible, quantifiable consequences. This
approach deviates greatly from that of typical decision support models; however, this
shift is necessary to more adequately capture the ethical space surrounding a given
situation so that, ultimately, it can facilitate ethical decision-making.

1.2

Development of the precursor Metric of Evil model
The Metric of Evil, a predecessor or precursor to the REV, was designed to

measure the comparative evil associated with alternative military courses of action
(COAs). The intent of the Metric is to provide military analysts with an ethical
viewpoint when considering alternative courses of action in a given scenario, eventually forming the basis for tool that analysts could inject into broader COA analysis
tool chains. For the Metric, evil is explicitly defined as “intentional or anticipatable
harm” as inspired mostly by Phillip Zimbardo in [80]—thus, the Metric attempts to
represent both the consequences of a COA and the actor’s intentions.
A University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH) research team was then funded
to further the Metric concept. This team consisted of three researchers and two stu6

dents from the university’s Center for Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis (CMSA)
and the Center for the Management of Science and Technology (CMOST). The team
was interdisciplinary in nature and collectively included expertise in simulation, military science, history, and computer programming. The author of this dissertation
managed the team’s efforts for that research under contract number W31P4Q-09-D0010 with a stated period of performance from February 8, 2010 to July 8, 2010.

1.2.1

Inception, development, and design
Tackett first provided the UAH research team with a white paper describing

his initial effort [72], which includes a brief insight into the background and context
of the project and a preliminary model design (known as “version 0” of the Metric,
or “Metric v0,” throughout this document). This version of the model compared
the relative evil of two COAs through a sum of individuals harmed, weighted by the
severity and the intent behind the harm.
Metric v0 categorizes ethical consequences on two independent axes: the Harm
Index and the Order of Evil. The Harm Index includes Hardship, Suffering, Injury,
and Death, and the Order of Evil includes Necessary, Consequential, Selfish, and
Malicious. These categories are defined in Tackett’s white paper. Combining the two
axes produces a 4 × 4 structure of estimated harms for a given COA, and a weighted
sum of them produces a Sum of All Evil for the COA that can be compared to the
Sum of All Evil for another COA to determine which is viewed by the model as the
“lesser evil.”
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The UAH team’s process of enhancing this concept started with a literature
review of several fields related to the project, including military COA analysis, decision models and aids, quantification of evil and other related concepts, and survey
design and interpretation. Using knowledge from this review process, the team then
designed and implemented another version of the model (“Metric v1”). This version expands Tackett’s original concept by providing a more detailed, objective, and
quantifiable list of potential consequences; allowing harms’ weights to be calibrated
to reflect a given value system; shifting focus from an actor’s maliciousness to a more
direct measure of intent; and introducing “global” parameters by which the overall
importance of the intent and magnitude of harms can be adjusted. The detailed
harms and shift to intentionality allow for a more objective and quantifiable measure,
and the global parameters allow the model to match a wider variety of moral codes.
At its core, Metric v1 also assesses the evil associated with COAs through a
weighted sum of harms. However, Metric v1 expands the list of consequences considered by the model and provides the consequences in more definitive, measurable detail.
It was designed to allow its list of consequences to be expanded (or otherwise modified) without requiring adjustments to the model’s underlying structure; however, the
“default” list was developed to be as extensive as possible. Measured casualties in this
default list include those of friendly forces, enemy forces, and non-combatants; casualties are additionally subdivided into those killed, wounded or injured, and captured
or missing. It also captures non-combatant hardships, including those left without
essential facilities or resources, homeless or refugee, unemployed, or otherwise economically damaged. The list also considers the number of essential facilities, cultural
8

facilities (such as mosques, monuments, and other historical sites), and non-essential
facilities for friendly, enemy, and neutral parties destroyed via a COA. The model also
includes certain moral, legal, and ethical concerns, including numbers of international
law violations, treaties broken, and national promises broken.
Metric v1 classifies harms in terms of the actor’s direct intent, rather than on a
scale similar to Metric v0’s Order of Evil. Although represented as a numeric value in
the model, this intentionality is solicited from the user as Unanticipated, Anticipated,
or Intentional.1 As mentioned, the user of the model can also adjust the effect of intent
and the sheer magnitude of harms, essentially implemented as exponents to harms’
weights and numerical values. For example, by some hypothetical cultural standard,
one’s intent behind a major consequence may not matter (perhaps the consequence
could be an accident or an unintended side-effect); and the model would thus allow
this standard to be captured by effectively nullifying the effect of intent. Metric v1
also compares the weighted sums of each COA through a process inspired by statistical
measures, rather than on a simple numerical difference of their weighted sums as per
Metric v0.

1.2.2

Metric versions’ designs
As described in [54], the designs of both Metric v0 and Metric v1 both incor-

porate linear summations of weighted factors. This section describes the details of
each version’s design.
1

Unanticipated harms can only occur when evaluating historical COAs—by definition, if a
decision-maker conceives of the potential harm, then he/she has at least anticipated that it could
occur.

9

Harm Index

Table 1.1: General Matrix of Evil for Metric v0

Hardship
Suffering
Injury
Death

(j
(j
(j
(j

= 1)
= 2)
= 3)
= 4)

Necessary
(i = 1)
11
21
31
41

Order of Evil
Consequential Selfish
(i = 2)
(i = 3)
1(1+I)
1(1+I×2)
2(1+I)
2(1+I×2)
3(1+I)
3(1+I×2)
(1+I)
4
4(1+I×2)

Malicious
(i = 4)
1(1+I×3)
2(1+I×3)
3(1+I×3)
4(1+I×3)

Both versions of the model provide a “Delta Goodness” between two COAs—
that is, it provides a measure of how “good” one COA is compared to another. Metric
v0’s design is a simple linear model, while Metric v1 has a more complex mathematical
formulation.

1.2.2.1

Formulation of Metric v0

The following formula is the core of Metric v0, used to calculate the evil
associated with a COA:

E=

X

1+I×(Oi −1)

wij xij |wij = Hj

i,j

This value, referred to as the Sum of All Evil, is a weighted sum of each
category of harm tied to that COA. i and j represent indices across the Order of Evil
and the Harm Index. xij represents the estimated number of individuals affected by
a particular category of harm; for example, x13 is the number of Necessary Injuries,
and x44 is the number of Malicious Deaths. wij is the weight for the input value,
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Harm Index

Table 1.2: Initial weights for Metric v0; I = 1

Hardship
Suffering
Injury
Death

(j
(j
(j
(j

= 1)
= 2)
= 3)
= 4)

Necessary
(i = 1)
11 = 1
21 = 2
31 = 3
41 = 4

Order of Evil
Consequential Selfish
(i = 2)
(i = 3)
2
1 =1
13 = 1
2
2 =4
23 = 8
32 = 9
33 = 27
42 = 16
43 = 64

Malicious
(i = 4)
14 = 1
24 = 16
34 = 81
41 = 256

calculated as HjOi . The step parameter I adjusts the effect of intent; as I increases,
the Order of Evil more significantly impacts the Sum of All Evil.
Table 1.2 provides the initial weights for Metric v0’s categories, as set when
I = 1. Two COAs A and B can be compared by computing the Delta Goodness
between the two actions, which is simply the difference between their Sum of All Evil
values:
∆GAB = EB − EA
The Metric then chooses the ethically preferable COA as follows:
if ∆GAB > 0 then return COA A
else if ∆GAB < 0 then return COA B
else if ∆GAB = 0 then return null
end if
If ∆GAB > 0, COA A is considered to be less evil and is thus selected; conversely, if ∆GAB < 0, the model regards COA B as less evil and selects it instead. If
∆GAB = 0, the COAs are considered to be ethically equivalent, and the model does
not select either COA.
11

1.2.2.2

Formulation of Metric v1

Significant portions of this section are derived, with slight modifications, from
the author’s contributions to [54].
Metric v1’s internal design is more complex than Metric v0’s, capturing concepts such as estimated confidence, intentionality, and magnitude via a set of “global
parameters.” Metric v1 breaks ethical harm down into detailed tangible consequences
and associates a weight with each. Table 1.5 provides a list of consequences and parameters (with numerical columns to be explained in Section 1.2.3).
Due to the subjective nature of morality in general, the model is designed
to be flexible with respect to ethical factors—it can be modified to reflect different
baseline morality systems. This is an important consideration due to cultural differences in the perception of morality—for example, one culture may deem intention to
be especially important, where another culture may concentrate solely on a utilitarian, consequence-based view of an action’s end results; one culture, which may view
mosques and other cultural sites as very sacred, may prioritize protecting them over
protecting the lives of soldiers and civilians, where another culture may prioritize the
protection of life over all other factors. The default values for the model’s various
weights and factors represent the assessment of individuals who are largely American
in culture and who are experts in military, ethics, philosophy, psychology, history,
and other related fields.

12

The input variables represent the potential consequences—specific types of
harm and intent—of a COA. From these inputs, the model calculates a measure of
evil associated with the COA.
Given that the consequences of a COA are inexact estimates, values for the
input parameters take the form of an estimated low value and high value. These
values represents the range that is expected to bound the input parameter’s actual
value. While no attempt is made to measure an actual statistical distribution of the
value, the Delta Goodness is adjusted based upon the user’s confidence in his or her
estimations.
Moreover, a decision-maker’s sense of evil may not scale linearly with the
count of consequences of a COA. Conceptually, this is similar to the economic law
of diminishing returns—where one additional dollar is worth less, in a psychological
sense, to a millionaire than to an impoverished individual. Similarly, the marginal
evil for each additional life lost or person enduring hardship may be said to decrease
as more individuals are affected; effectively, a COA where two lives are lost may not
be twice as evil as a COA where one life is lost in some cultural contexts. Thus,
the model accounts for the possibility that, psychologically, a given culture’s baseline
morality in terms of its perception of evil may not scale linearly with the number
of instances of a particular tangible consequence. For example, once a COA begins
to lead to loss of life, it may be seen as more evil than one that does not; to this
particular culture, the exact number of lives lost may be less significant as the number
increases.
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The intention associated with a COA’s level of harm is also provided, but in a
different sense than that described in Metric v0. Unexpected consequences are rated
as very low intention, anticipated consequences are rated as a middling intention, and
direct intentions are rated as a high intention. An actor may determine that he or
she intends to cause enemy combatant casualties in evaluating a particular COA; in
another, he or she may see enemy combatant casualties as a factor that is anticipated
but not directly intended. Unexpected consequences, however, can only occur when
evaluating COAs that are historical, hypothetical, or, otherwise, where the actor is
in reality removed from the user of the tool.2
The following attributes are associated with each input parameter i:
• li low estimated value (0 < li < hi )
hi high estimated value (li < hi < ∞)
The low and high estimated values, respectively, are the lowest and highest
reasonable values that the input parameter is expected to have.
• ci confidence level (0.0 < ci < 1.0)
The confidence level is a measure of the user’s confidence that the actual value
for the parameter will reside between li and hi . A value of 1.0 represents complete and full confidence in the values estimated above. A confidence of 0.9
may, for example, reflect a value derived from primary source materials, where
2

This is because the user must at least anticipate that an actor could cause any consequence
incorporated into the model in order to include them in the first place. Actors in historical or
hypothetical situations, however, may not anticipate some of their actions’ consequences.
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a confidence of 0.5 may reflect a value that is calculated or estimated from a
set of relatively uncertain data.
The model implementation solicits this value from the user as a percentage,
where 0% maps to 0 and 100% maps to 1.0.
• mi measure of intentionality (0.0 < mi < 1.0)
Intentionality is a measure of how directly the COA under study causes this
particular consequences—the intention of the actor. Actions that are directly
caused as a result of the COA and intended to occur are considered to be completely direct and intended, where indirect effects may include enemy retaliation
and other similar, less foreseeable actions.
The model solicits intentionality from the user as one of three potential choices
and maps them to a numerical value used in its internal calculations:
– Unexpected (intentionality of 0.1). Unexpected consequences refer to cases
where the actor under study has no reasonable way to assume that its
actions could cause the consequences associated with this parameter.
– Anticipated (intentionality of 0.5). An anticipated consequence is defined
as one that is or can be foreseen by the actor, but is not caused by that
actor.
– Intended (intentionality of 1.0). Intended consequences are those that are
a direct result of the COA under study—that is, consequences that the
COA is designed to achieve.
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• wi weighting (0 < wi < ∞)
The influence of this input parameter in deciding the overall evil associated
with the course of action. The weightings provided by the user may take on
any value greater than zero, and they are normalized by the model—that is,
they are recalculated such that they sum to 1.
Certain global factors influence how the model calculates its end consequences.
These are as follows:
• F evil power factor (0 < F < ∞)
The evil power factor determines the degree to which intention is factored into
the evil associated with each parameter.
For 0 < F < 1, there is little difference between anticipatable harm and intentional harm. As F approaches zero, intention has a less significant impact
on the overall evil rating. For 1 < F < ∞, there is a large difference between anticipatable harm and intentional harm. As F approaches infinity, only
those consequences that are fully intended by the actor are factored into the
assessment. F = 1 represents a linear relationship between intention and evil.
For very low values of F , an actor’s intention is barely factored into the Metric’s
analysis—the evil associated with an action is nearly constant with respect to
the actor’s intentions. In this case, anticipated consequences are considered
to nearly as evil as intentional consequences within the same category. For
F values that are very high, the opposite is true; only the consequences that
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the actor absolutely intends are considered evil, and unforeseen and anticipated
consequences are overshadowed by the intended consequences.
Middling F values represent some mixture of these two philosophies, a certain
degree to which the intention of an action matters in an ethical sense. The
exact value of F used depends upon the baseline morality that the model is
configured to represent.
• D diminishment factor (0 < D < 1)
In a certain baseline morality, one’s perception of evil may not scale linearly with
the sheer number of individuals or items affected by a COA. The diminishment
factor captures this by scaling input parameter values appropriately.
The effect of the diminishment factor on the input parameter values is similar to
the effect of the evil power factor on intention. When D is very low, the marginal
evil of additional quantities decreases—the fact that civilian casualties occur at
all will outweigh the actual number of civilian casualties, for example. When
D = 1, there is a linear relationship between an input parameter’s value and
the evil associated with it. Again, a particular value of D represents part of a
particular baseline morality.
• Zl low confidence standard score (0 < Zl < Zh )
Zh high confidence standard score (0 < Zh < ∞)
For a given COA, a range of evil is calculated. This range is based on the low
and high estimates for input parameter values. An overall confidence in this
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range of evil is also calculated based upon the analyst’s confidence in his or her
input values.
Together, this range of evil and the confidence in this range relate the evil value
to a particular statistical distribution (assumed to be a normal distribution).
This accounts for the possibility that an analyst may not be completely confident
in the estimates provided to the model and that there is a certain level of
uncertainty in what the evil associated with the COA is when it is actually
carried out.
If the overall confidence in the range is very high, then it is assumed that there
is a significant chance that the actual evil of the COA resides within that range.
If the overall confidence is low, then there is less of a chance that the COA’s
evil value resides within the range.
The high confidence standard score represents half the number of standard
deviations from the mean that the range covers if there is a 100% confidence
in the range. The low confidence standard score represents the same for a 0%
confidence in the range. For example, if the confidence in the range for COA
j is 100%, and if Zh = 3.0, then the standard score zj = Zh = 3.0. The range
calculated for the COA thus represents +3σ. This, in turn, means that there is a
99.73% chance that the evil value for the COA falls within the range calculated
by the model.
In calculations where confidence in the COA’s evil value range is low, the range
calculated by the model will represent less of the span of potential evil for the
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COA. The actual standard score used in calculations is linear, bounded by these
two values, and dependent on the actual confidence calculated for the range.
Rather than relying upon simple averages of low and high estimates for values,
this formulation compares COAs with uncertainty in mind. A COA that has
more of a potential for evil is thus determined by the model to be more evil
overall than another.
Metric v1’s base formulation for summation is similar to Metric v0’s but is
given a more statistical treatment. The “low evil,” “high evil,” and average of the
two are calculated first as follows:

el =

nc
X

liD mFi wi

i=0

eh =

nc
X

F
hD
i mi w i

i=0

µ=

e l + eh
2

The “low evil” and “high evil” for a COA, are based upon low and high
estimates (li and hi ) of each input’s value; µ combines them to produce a “mean evil”
for the COA. The total number of consequences is given as nc .
Several parameters affect how harm inputs contribute to the calculation of
the COA’s evil value. D, the diminishment factor, implements a “marginal evil”
that affects how much the magnitude of harms matters in calculating evil—for a low
value of D, the first harms yield more evil than subsequent harms. Collectively, the
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expression mFi wi weights the input. mi is a measure of intentionality associated with
the input, and wi is the weight associated with it. F , the evil power factor, affects
how much intentionality effects evil—a low value indicates that end consequences of
actions overshadow their intent, while a high value indicates that the intent behind
an action significantly contributes to the evil of the action. In addition to allowing
for experts’ weighting of particular harms to be captured through proper calibration,
it also allows capturing their perception of more general ethical notions.
The mean evil for the COA is combined with a variance, which also allows the
model to assess the effect of estimation uncertainty on the evil and to compare COAs
statistically. The confidence for the range of evil and standard deviation for the evil
are calculated as follows:
c=

X

cij wi

z = Zl + (Zh − Zl )c
Finally, the standard deviation is calculated as:

σ=

eh − µ
z

In these calculations, Zl and Zh are the low and high confidence standard
scores, which affect how the model user’s sense of risk aversion impacts the comparison
between COAs. Their values default to 0.5 and 3.0, respectively, which provides a
sense of their scope. Together, the range of evil and the confidence in the range specify
parameters for a particular statistical distribution, assumed to be normal, that the
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evil value may have. The Delta Goodness between COAs A and B is a statistical
comparison, computed as follows:

µB − µA
∆GAB = p 2
σB + σA2
Ultimately, Metric v1 uses the same heuristic as Metric v0 to select a COA
based upon its own ∆G:
if ∆GAB > 0 then return COA A
else if ∆GAB < 0 then return COA B
else if ∆GAB = 0 then return null
end if

1.2.3

Results and validation
In general, the process of validating a model involves comparing a model’s

results to the simuland, or the phenomena or real system that it is intended to model,
while a calibration process involves adjusting a model’s parameters to provide an
even better match to the simuland. Considering that the model’s simuland (evil)
is nebulous in nature, it was important for the research team to develop a proper
validation process for the model.
Ideally, the Metric would represent evil in the most objective way possible.
Human assessment was considered to be the most objective measure available. Thus,
the model was iteratively compared and calibrated against the assessment of human
experts in military operations, political science, philosophy, ethics, religion, psychol-
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Table 1.3: Ultimate rsesults from initial round of work
Rater class
Humanities experts
Non-experts
Metric v1, fully calibrated
All experts
Metric v0, fully calibrated
Military experts
Metric v1, intact
Metric v0, original
Random

Average rank
24.7
25.9
27.0
28.2
30.0
30.9
37.0
46.0
57.7

Count
15
15
1
35
1
20
1
1
12

ogy, and other related fields. The process was largely one of retrodiction; though
the model is designed to aid commanders through the evaluation of future potential
actions, validation was performed by comparing the model’s assessment of historical
scenarios and actions with the assessments of experts. The team also divided experts
into two classes, military experts and humanities experts,3 and the model’s assessments were compared to each. The model’s assessments were additionally compared
to those of non-experts (those with little or no military, ethical, or political training)
and randomly-generated ratings.
Relevant facts, statistics, context, and information on four historical military
scenarios were collected through historical research, which was primarily conducted
by a student member of the research team. The set of scenarios for further research
and evaluation were determined in a way that, collectively, tested the model’s flexibility. The Warsaw Uprising of 1944 and the Bay of Pigs invasion represented relatively
conventional yet interesting military operations. These were tempered with the inclu3

“Humanities” experts are referred to as “non-military” experts in [54]; the term is changed in
this document for clarity.
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Table 1.4: The effect of step parameter I and rank of Metric v0
I
0.125
0.250
0.500
1.000
2.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
8.000
16.000

Rank of Metric v0
47
47
47
47
43
43
32
30
30
30

sion of the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shoot down, which presents a moral dilemma
that relies heavily upon context that is difficult to capture quantitatively. Operation Enduring Freedom rounded out the set of scenarios, providing a more complex,
modern, uncertain, and politically-charged mission, the context of which is more representative of hypothetical COAs that commanders would typically assess using the
model.
Surveys provided to human raters presented a short description of each scenario, a collection of statistics, and a set of situations and actions by multiple parties
within the scenarios. Raters were asked to perform pairwise comparisons of the relative evil of these actions via anonymous survey. Then, the assessments of each rater
(human, model, and random) were ranked on overall agreement with expert raters.
Table 1.3 presents the results from this effort, with a lower rank indicating
better agreement with experts. Once calibrated, both Metric v0 and Metric v1 agreed
very well with human experts, and all formulations of the model performed much
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Table 1.5: Consequences, their weights, and global parameter values for various
versions of Metric v1
Category
Friendly force casualties

Enemy force casualties

Non-combatant casualties

Non-combatant hardship

Friendly infrastructure damage

Enemy infrastructure damage

Neutral infrastructure damage

Other considerations

Parameter
Killed
Wounded or injured
Captured or missing
Killed
Wounded or injured
Captured or missing
Killed
Wounded or injured
Captured or missing
Without essential resources
Homeless or refugee
Unemployed
Economically damaged
Essential facilities destroyed
Cultural facilities destroyed
Non-essential facilities destroyed
Essential facilities destroyed
Cultural facilities destroyed
Non-essential facilities destroyed
Essential facilities destroyed
Cultural facilities destroyed
Non-essential facilities destroyed
Major international law violations
Major treaty violations
Minor international law violations
Minor treaty violations
National promises broken

Or.
5.0
2.0
1.0
5.0
2.0
1.0
20.0
8.0
4.0
10.0
7.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
6.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0

Int.
2.0
1.5
1.0
2.0
1.5
1.0
30.0
8.0
2.0
8.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
8.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
4.0

Cal.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
90.0
0.0
7.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.0
0.5
3.0
1.0

3.0
0.5
3.0
0.85

3.0
0.5
3.0
0.5

Parameter
Global factors

Evil power factor
Low confidence std. score
High confidence std. score
Diminishing factor
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better than random raters. Table 1.4 shows how the step parameter I affects Metric
v0’s rank—it asymptotically decreases to 30, with no further improvement. Table 1.5
shows, in order, values for parameters the original Delphi assessment, the “intact”
version of the model (where each parameter was “forced” to have weight of 1% or
more), and the “fully calibrated” version of the model.
This result strongly suggests potential for the concept of quantifying ethical
violation, or at least harm and hardship, for use in military decision-making.
More information on the background, literature survey, model design, validation experiment, results, and conclusions of this initial effort can be found in [54], the
technical report on this effort.

1.3

Shortcomings of the Metric’s approach
Table 1.3 shows two variants of each of the two versions (v0 and v1) of the

model.4 The “original” variant of Metric v0 is the version originally provided by Tackett. The “intact” variant of Metric v1 preserves the presence of all of the model’s
harm inputs—that is, every consequence was forced to contribute to the model’s analysis and could not be dropped via the weighting process—where the “fully calibrated”
version does not have this limitation.
The “fully calibrated” variants of both v0 and v1, which represent parameter
weightings that resulted in the maximum agreement with experts, both showed an
4

In [54], the “intact” variant of Metric v1 is referred to as “unskewed,” while the “fully calibrated”
variant is referred to as “skewed.”
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overwhelming bias toward malicious or intentional non-combatant casualties. These
casualties completely overshadowed all other factors.
Metric v0 most closely matched expert assessment when “malicious” deeds
were weighted several orders of magnitude over “necessary” deeds; the weighting for
malicious deaths, for example, is 43×4 or 67,108,864 times greater than the weighting
for necessary deaths. In the fully calibrated Metric v1, non-combatant casualties constituted 90% of the model’s assessment of a given action, most other consequences
were simply not considered as evidenced by their 0% weighting, and a high “evil
power factor” and low “diminishment factor” suggested that the killing of civilians—
especially intentionally—mattered significantly, but that further increases in the number of civilian casualties did not.
The results of these calibrations may align well with the layperson’s intuition
regarding ethical matters—that intentional, malicious killing of innocents is “evil.”
However, they suggest that the underlying factors that humans use in their ethical
assessments may not adequately captured by the model and that a different approach
is needed.
Both versions of the Metric concentrated on tangible consequences of actions,
such as casualties and hardships endured, treaties broken, and buildings destroyed.
While Metric v1 allows its list of consequences to be expanded, it is unlikely that
any tangible consequence could be seen as comparable to the killing of civilians. A
large part of the motivation behind the development of the REV was the notion that,
if ethical decision models relied solely upon tangible consequences, this one partic-
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ular factor would continue to overshadow any other factor, leading to questionable,
unsound, and arguably useless moral comparisons between actions.
One expert rater hinted at a component of a tradeoff that is missing from the
Metric’s evaluation as follows:
How many casualties are justified in the promotion or defense of capitalism, democracy, communism, fundamentalist Islam, or the power of a
warlord? [54]
The Metric research indicated that the model cannot readily weigh the loss of
human life against the promotion of ideals or principles. This suggests that a different
decomposition of the simuland would be more meaningful and relevant for evaluating
actions.
In addition, some human raters, including experts on ethical matters, commented that they could not make the necessary comparisons using the given definition of “evil,” which was expressed in terms of intentional harm. Seven of the 14
comments related to this issue. For most of those who expressed this sentiment, this
was either because they disagreed with the definition or did not know how to work
with it [54]. One rater argued that service members’ actions in following rules of
engagement, though they may intentionally inflict harm, should not be viewed as evil
and that “the concept of ’morals’ has been stripped from the dictated definition” [54].
Another remarked that immoral properties of an action must be highlighted,
discussed, and evaluated, though he or she did not explicitly state the nature of these
properties. Still another wondered, in an arguably visceral way, why he or she was
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requested to compare the United States’ reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks with the Soviet Union shoot down of a civilian plane that posed a potential
military threat. Several raters discussed the importance of the overall context of
certain historical scenarios at length, which are difficult for quantitative models to
capture. These comments indicate that intentional harm does not adequately equate
with human perception of evil—more specifically, that the former is either tangential
to, a consequence of, or a subset of the latter.
According to written, free-form comments left by human raters, experts were
much less comfortable than non-experts, overall, with using the provided definition
of evil and making comparisons based upon that definition. This suggests that perhaps a more developed understanding of typical military scenarios or of the nature of
morality makes one more aware of the nuances present in situations that test one’s
morals, especially in such a life-critical or otherwise significant way as those in military operations. Non-experts may be more likely to accept equating “evil” with
“intentional harm,” where experts may question their equivalency.
The raters’ comments revealed more about their perceptions of evil than anticipated during the validation experiment. Moreover, the fact that some raters were
unable to make the choices requested from them—whether due to a disconnect or
disagreement on the definition of evil, the structure of the survey, the scenario descriptions provided to them, or the overt and perhaps overly direct Likert scale-like
treatment of evil—suggested that a modified approach to assessing raters’ moral priorities was needed.
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This continuing research, centered around the development of the REV, presents
a new approach that intends to resolve these shortcomings.

1.4

Expectations for REV research
Following is a discussion on general expectations of dissertation-level research

and how this research satisfies them. These expectations include a sound measurement of the utility and quality of the work as well as contribution to the overall
body of knowledge through publications, presentations, reports, and other scholarly
disseminations of knowledge.

1.4.1

Standards of quality and measurement
While many of the important results of the REV research are directly quan-

tifiable, not all are—some involve further exploration of the qualitative context surrounding the model and its applications. However, certain objective measures can be
used to determine the quality and utility of the ideas captured by the research.
The primary measurement of the model’s utility is in quantitatively comparing
its assessments to those of experts. Specifically, the better the model’s rating in this
process, the more accurately it can be said to capture expert assessments. This type
of evaluation, outlined for the Metric research effort in Table 1.3, has already proven
useful in guiding further improvements to the model.
A better rating for REV would indicate that the shifts in focus outlined in
this research lead to a better formulation for the model. Moreover, a less favorable
rating for the new model would reveal flaws with its design; however, the research
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Current
perception of
morality
P

Moral perception
useful for military
decision analysis
A

Moral perception
able to be captured
and modeled
M

Figure 1.1: Sets of areas most closely related to the REV. The area of interest for
this study is outlined as the intersection of the sets.

would still contribute by indicating that future efforts would be more successful by
extending the approach embodied by the Metric rather than the REV.

1.4.2

Scope of the REV research in philosophy, military applications, and
modeling and simulation
Figure 1.1 illustrates the scope of this effort and its overall context in terms

of moral perception. The figure also presents the shortcomings of the research and
potential areas of expansion.
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This view of moral perception is divided into sets. Following illustrates each
key region of the refined diagram with explanation and examples where appropriate.
The set “Current perception of morality” is denoted as P , “Moral perception able
to be captured and modeled” as M , “Moral perception useful for military decision
analysis” as A, and the absolute complement of some set S as S 0 . This divides the
diagram into several sets and regions, with key regions identified as follows:
• P , current moral perception—the moral perception and sets of ethical principles
and valuations held currently.
• M , moral perception that is able to be defined, captured, and modeled. Its small
size compared to the other sets is intended to illustrate the notion that most
possible moral perception cannot be captured in a model—that is, that current
moral perception and perceptions that are useful in this subject domain encompass a larger space than that which can be modeled. Owing to the difficulty of
the problem of quantifying and framing morality, the set of moral perceptions
that can be captured through modeling techniques does not completely overlap
our current moral perception. In addition, some hypothetical or past moral
perceptions—those that are outside of our current perception—could very well
be captured via model. As tools and methods for quantifying and capturing
morality evolve, this set can grow to encompass more moral perception. An
ideal model along the lines of the REV would ideally encompass the entire sets
of current moral perception and those useful for some specific domain.
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• A, moral perception that is useful for military decision analysis, the subject
domain of this research.
• M 0 , moral perception that is unable to be modeled. Ineffable, indecomposable,
or ill-defined perception, such as very abstract perception or that on the nature
of political context, fits into this region. Like all potential ethical decision models, this research must necessarily make some simplifications and assumptions
about what portion of the domain is modeled, therefore inherently leaving out
some moral perception. One side goal of the research is to more crisply define
M and M 0 by demonstrating that some perceptions can or cannot be modeled.
Example perception: Do good.
• M ∪ P 0 , moral perception that can be captured via model but that resides outside of current moral perception. This may include unknown moral perception,
such as a set of principles that can potentially be predicted via model; hypothetical perception used to explore an alternate ethical problem space; or moral
perception previously held.
Consider practices that were once commonplace but are now regarded as barbaric or immoral according to current moral standards. For example, the provisions and intent behind the Geneva Conventions [30] can be considered part of
our current perception of morality after they were disseminated, codified into
ethical principles, and adopted internationally after World War II—but not
before they were so widespread. As another example, the level of race equality in the United States has certainly affected military and political decisions
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at various points in time—though such change has been gradual, ‘milestones’
could be set at differing opinions on the expansion of slavery, which culminated
in the Civil War and subsequent Constitutional amendments; as well as the
Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education [11] that sparked the
African-American Civil Rights Movement. Other significant court cases can
represent milestones that separate one baseline morality from another—for example, Miranda v. Arizona Supreme Court [45], which established the concept
of Miranda rights.
Differences in human moral standards before and after each of these milestones would naturally lead to different moral decisions. Comparing moral current perception to previous perceptions—or experimentations with hypothetical
perceptions—may lead to useful, meaningful analysis.
Example perception: Maximize the number of international treaties broken.
Example perception: Maximize the number of civilians harmed.
Example perception: Adhere to the Malleus Maleficarum [35] in the process of
identifying and prosecuting witches.
• M ∪ A0 , moral perception (whether current, past, future, hypothetical, or other
alternate) that can be captured via model but is not considered useful for military decision analysis. Since current, practical military decision analysis is the
domain of this research, this perception is not included in detail.
Example perception: Comply with DiaCorp manufacturing test requirement design specification (MTRD) standard document EC-210, which describes best
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practices in the disposal of waste products created as a result of DiaCorp consumer product testing. While this is a valid moral perception, it is not relevant
for military applications.
• P ∪ M ∪ A, the intersection of current baseline morality, perceptions that can
be captured via model, and perceptions that are useful for this case study’s
subject domain. This subset is the focus of this research.
Example perception: Minimize intentional civilian casualties during a military
operation. This is clearly within our current moral perception, easily quantifiable and thus able to be modeled, and relevant and useful for military decision
analysis.
(Potential) example perception: Keep one’s promises. This research aims to
capture principles similar to this one in a model through the use of subject
matter expert assessment. It is relevant to military operations involving, for
example, preserving or breaking international treaties and agreements.

1.4.3

Publications on and dissemination of Metric and REV research
The approach and findings of this research and extensions of that research

have been published and presented in a variety of formats. This effort has, so far, led
to the development of two journal articles; one has already been published, and the
other has been accepted. Two more articles are planned to be written and submitted.
The first article [57] has been published in a special issue of Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy. This issue focuses on machines that are able to reason
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ethically, also encompassing other applications of automated ethical assessment. The
article suggests that a model along the lines of the Metric (and, thereby, also of the
REV) could contribute to a foundation that would allow military drones, robots, and
other autonomous systems to incorporate ethics into their reasoning processes. It
also discusses the ethical responsibilities inherent in the development and use of tools
such as the model on the part of designers and users. In short, the article emphasizes
that designers have a responsibility to clearly and explicitly communicate their models’ limitations, and users have a responsibility to understand and act according to
these limitations, being careful not to accredit models for purposes for which they are
not suitable. It further expresses that responsibilities must be carefully considered if
model-based approaches are to be used for decision support; they must be considered
even more carefully if such approaches are to be used to guide automated ethical
reasoning.
The second article [60] is compiled from the research team’s technical report on
the initial effort [54] and was submitted to the Military Operations Research journal in
February 2012. The article has been accepted and is tentatively scheduled to appear
in the December 2013 issue of the journal.
The author plans to produce two more articles as a result of this research.
The first of these is an article discussing the REV research methodology and findings,
similar in tone to [60]. The second is a more philosophically-oriented discussion on
the nature of quantifying “evil” and ethical harm.
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1.5

Research questions
This research intends to answer the following questions:

1. Can a quantitative model adequately capture the ethical tradeoffs made by
military experts and humanities experts?
2. Does a model based upon ethical principles perform better than one based upon
tangible consequences?
3. Do principles other than civilian harm factor into expert assessment?
4. Do military experts, humanities experts, and non-experts make ethical tradeoffs
differently?
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Principles are the simplicity on the far side
of complexity.
—Stephen R. Covey
This chapter presents a review of the literature that extends beyond the review undertaken in the Metric research. The review is in large part directed by the
shortcomings of the Metric as identified in Section 1.3, so that the information may
be used to enhance the design of the REV. Overall, the literature survey is focused
on the psychological and philosophical context surrounding “evil,” attempts at quantifying it and related phenomena, general model design, and various statistical and
survey techniques for use in an enhanced validation survey process. It is organized in
a way that informs particular aspects of the REV research and development.

2.1

Revisiting evil as the simuland
Since the primary intent of this research is to support decision-making from an

ethical perspective, one particular focus for the literature review involves revisiting the
core of the Metric research—the simuland itself, and how that simuland is decomposed
and outwardly represented as a set of inputs.
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Evil is a very abstract phenomenon of a philosophical and psychological nature.
It can be viewed from many different perspectives and decomposed in just as many
different ways. For the Metric, evil is the simuland, internally defined explicitly as
“intentional or anticipatable harm.”
This section discusses a review of the philosophical context surrounding concepts such as ethical harm and evil, similar attempts to develop ethical decision
support models (including other attempts to measure evil itself), and an inquiry into
how evil and harm are interpreted and understood—and perhaps decomposed—by
human beings.

2.1.1

On adequately defining evil for measurement and modeling
To understand a phenomenon through scientific methods and through models,

it must first be adequately defined. The Metric research intended to provide a model
that compared ethical harms, posited that a measure of evil is a measure of ethical
harm [54], then proceeded to use evil as the subject of study. A clear definition of
evil would thus be a prerequisite for capturing it in a model; however, arriving at a
proper definition is a difficult—and possibly insurmountable—problem.
The definition “intentional or anticipatable harm” used in the Metric research
was driven by renowned psychologist Phillip Zimbardo’s own definition as “intentionally behaving—or causing others to act—in ways that demean, dehumanize, harm,
destroy, or kill innocent people,” excluding accidental outcomes [54] [80]. Many survey
subjects clearly stated that they viewed this definition as inadequate and simplistic,
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which strongly suggests that the Metric research did not provide sufficient attention
to the problem of defining evil.
However, it is not evident that such a concise and adequate definition can
even be found. In Evil: An Investigation, Lance Morrow states that evil “is the most
powerful word in the world—and the most elusive” [47], which highlights the sheer
difficulty in defining evil in an appropriately measurable way. In fact, Morrow states
that “[p]eople [...] write about evil as if it were a phenomenon subject to measurement
and scientific inspection—[...] it is not.” He also claims that it is helpful to “start by
admitting that evil cannot be satisfactorily explained.” Additionally, from a psychiatric standpoint, James Knoll claims that “attempts by behavioral science to define
evil as though it were an objective and quantifiable concept are inherently flawed” [33],
while Robert Simon states that “[l]ike pornography, most people recognize evil when
they see it” but that “arriving at a universal definition of evil [...] is impossible” [69].
The initial research effort outlined in [54] and the conclusions outlined in Section 1.3
of this proposal, especially those that arose from human raters’ comments, seem to
corroborate the notion that explaining evil in a universally satisfactory way is an
intractable problem.
The limitations of human understanding and reasoning, including our own
inability to completely see past our innate biases, make the problem of understanding
evil even more difficult. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes that even moral
philosophers, those who humanity trusts most to view morality from an objective
standpoint, all create views that justify “a desire of the heart that has been filtered
and made abstract” [50]—in other words, that attempts at a proper definition of
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morality (and, consequently, also of “evil” deviations from it) are greatly colored by
philosophers’ own biases.
While many contend that evil is difficult to clearly define, some ethicists further claim that it should not be clearly defined. Others, however, encourage further
scientific research and definition of the phenomenon in a scientific manner.
Robert Simon states that “[n]o bright line separates good from evil” [69].
Morrow asserts that while humans tend to attempt to compare evils, the word evil is
intended to be used as an absolute, that “[e]vil, inserted into a spectrum of relative
horrors ceases, in some subversive way, to be evil,” and that, since evil is a “powerful,
absolute word,” “permissible” brings evil into a “comfort zone” where it presumably
does not belong. Morrow further suggests that “perhaps it should not be explained,
since explanation is a slippery slope that tends to tilt toward acceptance” [47].
Simon Baron-Cohen, originator of the Empathy Quotient survey and author
of The Science of Evil, assesses that, so far, evil is “treated as incomprehensible” and
admits that nothing can entirely “convey its enormity” [6]. However, counter to Morrow, Baron-Cohen also states that a scientific understanding of evil is undoubtedly
helpful, if not absolutely necessary. He argues that, if the debate on the nature of
evil were not moved into the scientific realm where it can be properly understood,
then humanity would continue to employ circular reasoning and other forms of misunderstanding about the problem [6]. He writes that “[w]e [should not] simply shut
down the inquiry into how people are capable in behaving in such ways or use a
nonexplanation, such as saying people are simply evil.” This can be seen as a firm
stance against Morrow’s claim that “[e]vil is evil” and that the process of measuring
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evil innately relies solely upon instinct—a stance that embodies how many perceive
evil and that is embodied in certain comments provided by subjects during the initial
round of this research [54].
In reality, evil is a highly offensive word reserved primarily for severe judgments; it provokes an innate, visceral response. In [58] and other presentations, the
author of this proposal acknowledges this sentiment with some cautions with respect
to a proper interpretation of the goals of this effort.
Baron-Cohen explicitly states that not all individuals are capable of killing,
contrary to the perspective of Zimbardo and Milgram that virtually all people can be
pressured to do so. However, he agrees that certain situations allow evil to surface; for
instance, he and Zimbardo share the view that a lack of culpability and responsibility
is one factor of such situations [6] [80].
Some authors claim that some individuals have a higher capacity for evil actions than others. Baron-Cohen assumes that perpetrators of evil innately lack empathy, as if “a chip in their neural computer were missing,” and also posits that an
empathy gene exists [6]. Michael Stone, creator of the Scale of Evil for the classification of crimes, has stated that some individuals possess no “brake system” preventing
them from bothering or harming others [9].
However, the intent of this effort is not to morally judge people or groups,
especially the U.S. military, directly. The focus on the nature of malicious actions or
situations, rather than of people themselves, is aligned with the work of modern influential psychologists. In particular, Zimbardo’s situationist sensibilities, especially
reflected in research such as the well-renowned Stanford Prison Experiment, highlight
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the “perversion” of “good people” and claim that humans have “mental templates”
that can be structured for a variety of malicious or beneficial purposes [80]. Committers of violent homicides have spanned the spectrum of violent, repeat offenders
to those with exceptional self-control. In addition, Michael Welner, a forensic psychiatrist who has worked to classify and understand evil acts for use in courtroom
judgments, seemingly places himself at odds with Stone; he emphasizes the importance of focusing on actions rather than on the actors themselves [78].
To highlight the problem of focusing on individuals rather than acts, Morrow asks why we should outlaw murder and create laws against the murderer “if the
murder cannot help himself” [47]. Moreover, Knoll suggests that defining evil in a
psychiatric and personal context would “contribute to the stigmatization of mental
illness” and that “labeling someone as evil suggests that he or she is beyond redemption” or “outside the demarcation of being human”; the “label of evil will doubtlessly
stick” [33].
Deeper issues of whether human nature is innately good or evil, whether actions are subject to fate or are a function of a free will, and whether investigations of
evil acts should be, are relevant for many lines of philosophical inquiry. They must,
of course, be set aside for this particular research effort. However, the very existence
of these problems demonstrates how ungraspable the concept of evil truly is.

2.1.2

On measuring ethical harm and other subjective factors
Owing to these powerful, complex, and clashing stances on evil, and to the

original intent of the initial phases of the project, the REV more explicitly focuses on
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ethical harm rather than on evil itself. This is a semantic change, but not a trivial
one. “Ethical harm” is more tangible, less nebulous and polarizing, and more readily
applicable to decision support. This conclusion, however, warranted a broader survey
of the literature encompassing measuring any kind of ethical harm and, even more
broadly, measuring subjective factors.
Moreover, academic efforts to develop and justify mathematical formulas for
unquantifiable concepts are criticized in [67], where published “formulas” for happiness, misery, and female derriere attractiveness are all sarcastically mocked. There is
the possibility that some may consider ethical harm to be similarly unquantifiable and
thus not suitable for quantitative analysis. This research recognizes the limitations
of doing so, noting also that the model intends to capture a useful and pragmatic
notion of ethical harm rather than an absolute nature of evil or “absolute morality.”
The model’s quantitative assessments are also rigorously validated through
comparison to the assessments of human experts. However, as Hayden states of
Welner’s Scale, an “opinion poll” can never scientifically determine the nature of evil
crimes, unless one’s “aim is purely statistical—meant to collect and study the views
inherent in American culture today.” Further, she claims that a
poll tell you what people’s valuations are, but it can not tell you what
those valuations ought to be. [...] Throughout history slavery and genocide have been sanctioned by the majority—and written into law—but
they were never right [28].
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Despite potential criticisms of its implementation, the general intent of this
research—to create a model to support ethical decision-making—is sound. Welner
states that psychologists have had “a very uneasy relationship with evil [...] they are
not sure that they should be dealing with morality” but further insists that they must
do so [78]. Moreover, Knoll does agree with Welner that forensic psychiatrists have
such a responsibility if it can illuminate imperfections in their domain (the justice
system) that limit their “ability to apply [...] psychiatric knowledge honestly and
objectively”—so long as they allow “the limitations of psychiatric science” to “give
[them] pause” where necessary [33].
Zimbardo presents the following analogy, which further supports developing a
more rigorous, scientific understanding of the ethical realm:
“While a few bad apples might spoil the barrel (filled with good fruit/
people), a vinegar barrel will always transform sweet cucumbers into sour
pickles—regardless of the best intentions, resilience, and genetic nature
of those cucumbers.’ So does it make more sense to spend resources to
identify, isolate, and destroy bad apples or to understand how vinegar
works, and teach cucumbers how to avoid undesirable vinegar barrels?”
[80]

2.1.3

Toward defining, classifying, and quantifying ethical harm
Morrow claims that “we do not have instruments to detect evil as we have,

say, Geiger counters to measure radiation” and that “[t]here are no evilologists” who
understand evil as there are meteorologists who understand the weather [47]. His
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assertion that evil is an absolute indicates a disconnect between the concept of evil
and the particular property of actions that those who attempt to measure evil are
actually measuring.
Psychologists have, however, made attempts understand evil itself through
scientific quantification and classification. Zimbardo describes the intent of Stanley
Milgram’s studies of obedience as an example, as “a paradigm in which it was possible to quantify evil’ by the extremity of buttons pushed on a shock generator that
allegedly delivered shocks to a mild-mannered confederate who played the role of the
pupil or learner while the subject enacted the teacher role” [80].
Following is a discussion based upon recent attempts at capturing or quantifying ethical harm in general or, in some cases, evil specifically (for some given definition
of evil). Baron-Cohen’s Empathy Quotient is used as a kernel for a broader discussion of empathy as a primary concern in matters of good and evil. Michael Welner’s
Depravity Scale—and various criticisms of his method—provide insight into how evil
can be dissected. This section also discusses lessons from both of these systems and
their applicability to the REV’s development.

2.1.3.1

Empathy as a driving factor

Just as the Metric research directly equated evil and ethical harm, BaronCohen equates evil with another concept—a lack of empathy. He then focuses on
clarifying what is meant by empathy [6]. His definition was driven by scenarios such
as those of certain Nazi scientists who did not account for the humanity of their
research subjects.
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He defines an individual’s empathy as a capacity for “double-mindedness,” a
focus on both the individual’s needs as well as the needs of another [6]. His definition
requires both a recognition of the other’s thoughts and feelings and an appropriate
emotional response on the part of the individual. His Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire (which can be found in [4]) classifies individuals in terms of a sliding scale,
divided into levels of empathy ranging from zero empathy to empathic ’hyperarousal.’
Placement on this scale follows a distribution similar to the normal distribution, with
most individuals demonstrating middling levels of empathy.
The EQ was developed as a response to perceived failings of other similar
metrics, such as the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, both of which Baron-Cohen claims are too broad in scope.
Baron-Cohen found that the EQ is inversely correlated with the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (AQ), suggesting that this comparison lends validity to the EQ scale [4]. He
has expanded this idea in the development of a two-factor “empathizing-systemizing”
(E-S) theory [5] [37]. This theory explains autism and Asperger syndrome (AS) in
terms of empathizing and systemizing, the latter capturing one’s preference toward
analyzing systems and the rules that govern them, a likely strength of those with the
syndrome. He also claims that the theory destigmatizes autism and AS by recognizing
its potential areas of strength [5].
Others have connected empathy with ethical harm. For example, in speaking
of Michael Welner’s measure of depravity (discussed later in this chapter), Robert
Simon highlights the “failure of empathy” as one of its key characteristics [69]. He
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also highlighted Zimbardo’s definition of evil and further connected that definition to
empathy:
The suspension or absence of empathy is necessary to harm other people
intentionally. It is usually accompanied by the psychological mechanisms
of devaluation and projection. Persons intent on committing harm first
dehumanize and demonize others [...] the victims are part objects to be
used and discarded as the perpetrator pleases. [69]
Literature spanning both scientific personality psychology and personal development has long regarded empathy as a significant personality trait or cognitive
function of individuals. One of the traits captured by the widely-used, statisticallyderived Five Factor Model of personality is agreeableness, which itself includes facets
such as empathy, trust, sympathy, and compassion; a high score of agreeableness indicates high levels of empathy [39]. Another example is found in the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator personality assessment, which is inspired by the work of Carl Jung
outlined in [31] and widely used in less scientific workforce development applications.
One dichotomy measured by this assessment is that of “judging,” which indicates
an individual’s preference for rational decision-making using “thinking” or “feeling”
that suggest, respectively, an approached that is either ‘detached’ and logical, or more
associative [10]—perspectives which can be combined to form a holistic picture of an
object or situation under “judgment.” The significance and moral value of empathy
has also been outlined in the work of several authors on the subject of personal development; Stephen Covey’s The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, for example,
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emphasizes the importance of developing a sense of interdependence, an empathic
“win/win” approach to problem-solving, once self-leadership and independence is
mastered [13].
The frameworks behind many models of moral development, including those
developed by Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget, tend to place general patterns of
thought regarding obedience, self-interest, and fear of punishment at beginning stages
of moral development, empathy and societal concerns at later stages, and universal
principles at still later stages [14]. Kohlberg’s model, in particular, emphasizes that
just decisions arise when those involved in a conflict understand the perspectives of
all others involved.
As Baron-Cohen states,
Whereas the term “sympathy” has a long tradition, the term “empathy”
astonishingly only came into being at the turn of the last century. Astonishingly, because we believe that this ability is as old as Homo sapiens
itself. [4]
The concept of empathy as a valued innate trait has roots in neuroscience
and developmental psychology [6]. For instance, Hamlin, et al. found that infants
are capable of social judgments, preferring puppets that demonstrated cooperation
toward other puppets over those that demonstrated antisocial behaviors [27]; in this
case, infants recognized the value of cooperation and may have empathized with the
target of the antisocial behavior. Moreover, this tendency is not limited to humans
as once thought. Recent studies have strongly suggested that rats show forms of
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empathy as well; they experience emotional contagion, share food, spend time with
suffering peers, and attempt to free peers who are trapped in cages [7] [36] [51].
Knoll presents a related problem in defining evil, asking, “Evil from whose
perspective? The victim’s perspective? The perpetrator’s? The layperson’s? All will
be different, and all will simply consist of that individual’s subjective conception of
how evil is portrayed” [33]. In future scientific investigations into the concept of evil or
ethical harm, “double-mindedness” could serve as a reconciliatory “meta-perspective”
that incorporates appropriate aspects of each stakeholder’s perspective.
This research sets aside the question of whether the capacity for ethical harm
is an innate trait of certain individuals. Nonetheless, empathy has proven to be an
innately valued moral trait in humans and other animals, which suggests that it may
serve as a common thread in codified ethical doctrines, human perceptions, and moral
instinct.

2.1.3.2

Similar scales by forensic psychiatrists

While Metric v0 classifies the potential evil of military actions on a scale from
necessary to malicious [72], both Welner’s Depravity Scale and Stone’s 22-level Scale
of Evil classify the evil of crimes in terms of depravity, graveness, and severity.
The Depravity Scale has been in the public eye since around 2001, and it has
received great attention and acclaim, but also some skepticism and criticism from
those such as Simon [69], Knoll [33], and Hayden [28].
Welner’s scale uses a mixture of subjective classifications, such as “heinous”
and “atrocious,” and “grave risk[s]” to others, as well as objective classifications, such
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as a death to multiple victims, the use of a weapon, and property damage. Stone’s
Scale of Evil, which is loosely based on Dante’s Inferno, ranges from justified selfdefense to “schemers” to “psychopathic torture-murderers” [70]. Other significant
aspects of crimes are captured by these classification schemes as well; Welner deems
Charles Manson, for example, “exceptional” in his “murderous sadism and cruelty,”
primarily because he was able to inspire others to commit evil acts [38].
Welner’s overall approach is applicable to the REV project. In addition to
objective facts, his classification scheme also utilizes subjective terminology, which
had been embraced in the design of Metric v0 but avoided in the development of
Metric v1. His use of subjective terms, however, has been driven by courts’ descriptions of crimes in such terms as “heinous,” “atrocious,” “cruel,” “vile,” “inhuman,”
“wanton,” and “horrible,“ especially since courts use such terms in determining appropriate sentencing for crimes [38] [78]. Welner attempts to define these terms more
precisely, based upon evidence and public opinion [78], providing a tool with which
those who perform moral assessments can “do their homework” [38].
Like the REV, the Depravity Scale is not intended to replace a human judge
[78], and the Scale is still in development [38]. Thus, while the categories present
in the Standard are continually evolving, Welner’s approaches provide some insights
into domain-specific classifications for evil.

2.1.4

Conclusions
Morrow’s perception is that evil cannot be understood or framed in detail.

Despite this, many philosophers, psychologists, and scientists have nonetheless at50

tempted to develop models, classification schemes, and terminology in order to capture it. However, just as in the Metric research, the definition of evil used in these
models is arguably too specific—the beginning of this section details the many ethical
and practical problems with a narrow scope of evil. Along with other factors, this
led this research to reframe its simuland—and the branding of the model itself—in
terms of ethical harm rather than evil.
In combination, work by Baren-Cohen and Welner show that a sense of empathy drives human perception of morality and that morality must be categorized in
a systematic way in order to be understood. The most significant prospects for the
REV may be in the ability to capture principles that “shine a spotlight” [6] on various
perspectives involved in a conflict and that break ethical harm down into meaningful
consistent components. Since, as Knoll claims, “[t]racking down the roots of evil is
a process that requires delving inward in an attempt to discern what we don’t know
about ourselves, yet do to the other” [33], awareness of one’s own principles is deeply
connected to empathy. As such, the REV research involves a careful and meaningful
selection of ethical harms as inputs into the model.

2.2

Choosing a perspective for model inputs
As outlined above, the inputs into the REV—the various harms and viola-

tions of ethical principles that humans tend to use in making their assessments—
are an important area of study. Metric v1 views its simuland in terms of tangible,
measurable consequences—by default, including the number of casualties, number
of broken treaties, and number of essential utility facilities destroyed—arising from
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a given action. Section 1.3 suggests, however, this scheme is incomplete and does
not meaningfully capture ethical harm or evil. Thus, further inquiry can view an
action’s resultant harm in terms of its consequences or in terms of the principles that
it violates.

2.2.1

Consequentialism versus deontologicalism
The consequentialist and deontological approaches differ in terms of the nature

of their philosophies and, in terms of this research, an ethical decision support model’s
inputs and outputs.
Utilitarianism, a well-known consequentialist approach, aims to measure good
outcomes, usually regardless of the intent of the actor. Often, the consequentialist
approach uses countable consequences as input. In addition, those ”counted” are often
classes of people. Inputs would include, for example, the number of casualties after an
attack or the number of people provided with essential resources in a reconstruction
operation. The structure of a consequentialist model revolves around a (possibly
weighted) sum of consequences. Of the versions of the Metric, Metric v1 is the most
utilitarian; it takes as inputs the tangible consequences of an action (but also accounts
for that these consequences may be weighted differently).
The deontological (or, specifically, Rossian) approach differs in that its measure
is adherence to a set of rules or principles, or overall duty. Often, this deontological
approach focuses on the intent of an actor, treating consequences as potential (but
not necessary) manifestations of that intent. Kant, for example, regards “good will”
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as the only intrinsically good thing, with various sets of rules and principles following
from it.
The inputs to traditional utilitarian approaches, such as that embodied by
Metric v1, are much easier to collect with accuracy; an action’s numbers of casualties,
for example, can be counted in many cases and estimated in others. Depending on
the weighting of each consequence, the Metric may or may not be sensitive to small
fluctuations in each input—though, in most cases, it is not expected to be so sensitive.
Capturing inputs for a deontological approach is more difficult. Metric v0’s
“semi-deontological” approach, which had loosely-defined Orders of Evil (Necessary,
Consequential, Selfish, and Malicious), relies upon the user to classify harms. In
the course of the Metric research, the research team classified harms present in each
scenario and attempted to provide significant justification for how they classified
harms, which in turn allows a level of traceability to classifications but was still very
subjective in nature.
The fundamental difference between the philosophies of John Stuart Mill and
Immanuel Kant (detailed in [44] and [32], respectively) is that of a focus on consequence and a focus on duty and intent. This literature survey emphasizes the
importance of an appropriate balance between the two perspectives that captures the
advantages of each.
Machine ethicists largely deem consequentialist ethical interpretations (such
as hedonistic act utilitarianism) as simple to implement but incomplete, and deontological (or principle-based) interpretations as a better match for human intuition
but more complicated to implement and prone to an undesired level of subjectiv53

ity [2] [25] [41]. They do note, however, that utilitarianists do have valid, standing
criticisms of Kantian-inspired approaches [25]. An ideal implementation would therefore capture abstract principles in a solid and quantifiable way, but the dilemma
presented by McLaren illustrates apparent problems in doing so [42].
McLaren’s dilemma effectively states that “any tool that provide ethical judgments must necessarily oversimplify its inputs in order to make ethical principles
computationally tractable; while any tool that avoids oversimplification can provide
ethically relevant information but not judgments.” Chapter 3 expounds upon this
in great detail. In [57], the authors claim that Metric v0 succumbs primarily to the
first of these clauses, while Metric v1 primarily succumbs to the second. Metric v0
classifies harms as Necessary, Consequential, Selfish, and Malicious and provides brief
definitions of each. An approach similar to Welner’s, which defined subjective terms
such as “heinous” and “grave” in more tangible ways [78], may alleviate any subjectivity and bias inherent in evaluating Metric v0 while still allowing fundamental
perceptions to be captured by the model.
Traits and categories of specific ethical principles are more straightforward
to capture and define than evil itself. As demonstrated by the apparent cognitive
disconnect between the term “evil,” “ethical harm” and the definition of “intentional
harm” provided in the model’s initial research [54], however, care must be taken to
ensure that definitions of the inputs used in the REV match intuitive understanding
or are otherwise made clear.
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2.2.2

Qualities embodied by general ethical principles
Several particular existing sets of ethical principles have been studied as part

of this research. General trends behind these principles have driven the process of
selecting an appropriate set of inputs for Metric.
Just War theory is a primary driver for many sets military principles. It is a
subject with a rich history and many adaptations. Codes and their summaries can be
found in several sources [19] [20] [48] [74] [75], which largely agree on a distilled set
of principles. Tailored to modern conflicts, country-specific Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) guides [12] [18] are directly related to ethics in military actions.
Morrow’s assessment is that an adequate “litmus test” for evil is whether or
not it can be avoided [47], which is corroborated by principles of military-specific
codes. Moreover, despite advocating different structures, Kant and Mill both highlight justice as a virtue [32] [44], and the Catechism also supports this notion [74]. In
addition, certain sets of principles used by the United States military, such as the set
of ethical values outlined in section 6.18 of the Air Force Professional Development
Guide [76] for Department of Defense employees, list honesty, integrity, loyalty, and
promisekeeping, among others, as virtues to uphold.
Other inquiries present further suggestions for ethical qualities. Factors of Welner’s crime categorization scheme, for instance, include prolonging suffering, targeting
the helpless, and maximizing casualties [78]. Zimbardo also claims that “non-action
can also become a form of evil.” Zimbardo additionally describes several circumstances that can create evil, such as gradual increases in aggression, high exit costs
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of a situation, and the diffusion of responsibility [80]. Morrow corroborates many of
these as catalysts for evil [47].
In his classic work The Right and the Good, W. D. Ross defines principles
such as fidelity, reparation, gratitude, non-injury, harm-prevention, beneficence, selfimprovement, and justice as prima facie duties that ought to be upheld by ethical
action [64]. This list has been modified and adapted by others [22], and it also corroborates and succinctly captures the sentiments embodied in many various existing
sets of ethical principles.
In [24], Gillon presents four principles for medical ethics, intended to provide
a “simple, accessible, and culturally neutral approach” for ethical issues in health
care. These include respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. Gillon’s principles are influenced by Ross’s terminology. Simon highlights two
principles that forensic psychiatrists are ethically required to uphold: honesty and
objectivity [69], with the former clearly corroborating other sets of ethical values and
the latter signifying a form of empathy—a perspective that rises above one’s own.
As stated, specific principles embodied by codes of military and war are another, more focused area of continued research for this effort. Those of the United
States are a subject of particular focus, as the United States military is the primary
target audience for the Metric. In the white paper describing the initial Metric of Evil
concept, Tackett describes an attempt a patriotic American ethic that encompasses
particular traits [72]. Some corroborate general ethical principles outlined above; for
example, his work views torturing prisoners and harming innocents as unethical actions. Other views embodied by his work can be said to reflect American military
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values, such as the necessity of combatant duty, intervention to uphold global human
rights, and a dedication to life, liberty, and happiness.

2.2.3

Conclusions
Consider two military scenarios invoked in the Metric research: the Bay of

Pigs invasion and the shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007. Both were included
to exercise the flexibility of the Metric. The former is a standard military operation,
wherein the sheer number of casualties and other consequences that occurred during
the event far outweighs the context surrounding the event. In contrast, the political
context surrounding the Korean Airlines 007 shootdown—which includes the Cold
War, the potential for nuclear fallout, a significant number of unknowns (such as
whether the target was a civilian or military aircraft), and the “why” behind the
conflict—far outweighs the “in-the-moment” consequences of the action.
If the context behind an action is largely unimportant, the principle that most
apparently weighs on raters’ minds is one akin to “do no harm.” In this case, capturing
the nuances such as the exact number of civilians leads to more accurate results that
more closely matches ethical assessments. However, in those where context is much
more important, other principles—such as “keep one’s promises”—will likely factor
more into ethical analysis. These additional principles are more difficult to break down
into an itemized list of consequences; therefore, a consequentialist scheme would not
capture the appropriate level of ethical nuance in a context-heavy scenario.
As McLaren states, ethical reasoning innately involves the use of abstract
principles and characteristics [41]. However, since the details behind how ethical harm
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manifests and is perceived are specific to a given culture and context, focusing on a
particular context (in this case, decision-making regarding military COAs) provides
more tangible assessments of ethical harm for that context. For instance, Welner’s
and Stone’s works both concentrate on the evils behind individual crimes [70] [78],
especially as investigated by court cases.
In summary, there are certain key advantages to attempting to capture ethical
harm via principles rather than tangible harms and specific consequences alone:
• Capturing violations of ethical principles via model, in a generalizable fashion
that can be applied across many domains, is a relatively novel and significant
idea.
• Related, capturing how human raters prioritize or trade between ethical principles is a novel and significant approach, as many tools (such as McLaren’s
SIROCCO [40], to be expounded upon in Section 3.2.2) and discussions of principles (such as Ross’s prima facie duties [64]) tend to assume that all principles
are weighted equally.
• It serves as a more stark comparison to the approach taken in the Metric research. The Metric and REV collectively provide two different frameworks—and
two different perspectives—on this problem.
Capturing principle violations rather than tangible harms and specific consequences has disadvantages as well:
• Capturing violation of principles is more subjective and nebulous than capturing
tangible harm; it is therefore a much more difficult problem. If not approached
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carefully, this shift introduce an unhelpful level of subjectivity, since principles
are less well-defined and more subject to interpretation than tangible harms.
• Tangible harms are much easier to capture than violation of principles. To
capture the latter, a set of principles must be defined, and COAs’ violations of
these principles must be rigorously devised and defended. “Instantiating” the
tool for a specific application would take more effort when defining principles
rather than sets of consequences. (However, in specific domains where principle
sets are explicitly codified, relatively “objective” and defensible inputs exist.)
The Metric used sets of tangible consequences—such as the number of individuals left in hardship or the number of essential facilities destroyed—as factors
to capture ethical harm. The results of the Metric research suggested that human
perception of ethical harm, in terms of tangible consequences, is largely driven by malicious, intentional casualties, as the calibration process removed virtually all other
tangible consequences from analysis.
Calibration of the REV’s principle weights could further suggest that intentional harm to innocent civilians—or some close variant of this idea—is essentially the
sole deciding factor in assessing ethical harm. However, the literature review suggests
that humans individually assess morality in terms of violation of ethical principles
and that framing ethical harm in terms of these principles has promise. This justifies
the shift in focus from tangible consequences to principles in the attempt to provide
a meaningful and useful model of ethical harm.
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2.3

Designing the model structure
Dawes states that, in making decisions, people excel in determining important

factors but not in integrating information [17]. She describes powerful models constructed upon just a few key factors, such as a predictive model of faculty ratings of
students based solely upon their grade point averages and Graduate Record Exam
(GRE) scores [15]. In addition, the models she describes are simple linear models,
very similar in structure to the Metrics. Her literature review of concluded that “[t]he
whole trick is to decide what variables to look at and then know how to add” [16].
While these simple models have proven to be powerful, many existing automated ethical reasoning programs use sophisticated artificial intelligence techniques
at their core. The following section describes the previous model versions’ designs,
other approaches in machine ethics, and insight into next steps for the design of the
REV.

2.3.1

Machine ethics approaches
Although research in modeling ethical decision making has a relatively short

history [40], it is worth drawing upon lessons from previous attempts. Many of
these are presented in nascent domains such as machine ethics and cognitive science.
Although some existing methods are simple in structure, more modern methods are
rooted in artificial intelligence.
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2.3.1.1

Applying the consequentialist evaluation scheme

In [25], Gips provides a sufficient assessment of consequentialist and virtuebased theories. Consequentialist evaluation schemes for ethical reasoning are structured as

P

i

wi pi , a weighted summation of ethical pleasure or goodness pi upon each

individual person i. Gips notes that, in traditional utilitarianism, the weight for
each person is equal, while ethical egoist would set the weight of all others to 0 and
a true altruist would set only his own weight to 0. If the model is to use such a
scheme and to fully incorporate Baron-Cohen’s notion of empathy, which suggests
‘double-mindedness’ and ‘shining two spotlights’ [6], weights for all individuals would
be positive.
Gips notes several issues with a consequentialist evaluation of ethics [25]. First,
he notes that it may not necessarily be just since it may sacrifice the well-being of
some for that of others. Second, he notes that individuals may not sacrifice a family
member or close friend’s well-being to help complete strangers. Third, he raises the
question of who should be counted as a person; this issue is related to the second.
Fourth, ethical ‘pleasure’ or goodness (as captured by pi int eh expression above)
is dependent upon the value system used by the scheme. The first, second, and
fourth issues all involve appropriately adjusting weights, which could be handled by
a method similar to the validation process undertaken by this research.
Gips provides explanations of deontological and virtue-based theories as well.
Quite simply, these involve the use of universal laws and intentions (such as those provided by Ross [64] or Gert [23]) rather than direct consequences. His discussion places
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emphasis on these methods, which further highlights the significance of determining
an appropriate set of inputs.
The difference between consequentialist and virtue-based theories parallels the
previously-mentioned distinction between utilitarianism and Kantianism as outlined
in [44] and [32], respectively. As noted by McLaren [40], there is still no agreement
on which approach is best. The model design is intended to be more broad than the
consequentialist scheme as outlined by Gips, since its inputs are not limited to harms
to individual people. As such, it is expected to overcome many of the shortcomings
outlined by Gips.

2.3.1.2

Implications of more sophisticated evaluation schemes

In [40], McLaren describes early machine ethics efforts such as Ethos and
Dax Cowart, which did not involve intelligent processing. He claims that logical
deduction as applied to ethical problems has not been fruitful, since these problems
are based upon abstract principles. McLaren further claims that computer programs
that propose decisions “oversimplifies the obligations of human beings and makes
assumptions about the best’ form of ethical reasoning”. Thus, his own efforts, TruthTeller and SIROCCO, differ from these early programs in that they focus on properly
framing ethical problems and providing ethically relevant information.
McLaren’s SIROCCO program analyzes scenarios based upon particular standard ethical codes in a given domain, such as those involved in disposing of hazardous
waste [41]. In addition, the methods undertaken by domain-specific case studies, including this model, may be generalizable and applied in unrelated domains—the
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model design, like that of SIROCCO, is intended to be flexible enough to represent
various codes of ethics.
While the REV’s aim is to provide ethical evaluation of alternatives, both this
document and its author’s statement of responsibilities in [57] agree with McLaren
that humans ought to provide the final verdict. The author also claims that people
might not allow computers to “mak[e] such decisions for them,” but that “they might
accept them as advisors” [40]. As such, the REV’s design and intent is more similar
to Ethos and Dax Cowart than to McLaren’s more recent and sophisticated efforts.

2.3.1.3

The use of linear decision-making models

As mentioned, Dawes has noted the power of linear models as decision aids in
several reviews and efforts [15] [16] [17] [29]. Dawes further claims that people are
not adept at integrating information from diverse and incompatible sources (such as
students’ grade point average and Graduate Record Examination scores) [15] [17].
In fact, Dawes’s studies have shown that even models whose weights have been
chosen randomly have outperformed human judges, so long as appropriate inputs are
chosen for the model. However, while, many decision support tools and decision
analysis techniques (such as the SMART technique and others described by Goodwin
and Wright in [26]) make use of linear models, the key differences between these tools
are in their respective weighting schemes.
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2.3.2

Conclusions
The value of linear models for decision support as described by Dawes [17] and

Goodwin and Wright [26] suggest that the underlying weighted sum structure of the
Metric is quite sound.
In addition, channeling Knuth [34], Gips states that efforts in machine ethics
may help people better understand ethics by forcing humanity to explain its ethical
principles. The model design process applies the power of linear models to the realm of
ethics, potentially revealing advantages to favoring simple consequentialist evaluation
schemes the more sophisticated schemes developed by McLaren and others.

2.4

Enhancing the model validation and calibration process
The validation survey involves properly eliciting ethical assessments from hu-

man raters so that the model can be compared and ultimately calibrated to them.
This research uses a similar process, enhanced by the findings of this literature review.

2.4.1

Eliciting assessments via questionnaire
Along with a set of comprehensive scenarios, the survey sent to human raters

must meaningfully capture their assessments in a straightforward way. The author has
examined several methods and case studies involving survey design, especially those
applied to ethical concerns. Anderson, Anderson, and Armen use integer estimates
from -2 to +2 to assess how much each member of a set of ethical duties was violated
or satisfied [40], which is similar to the Likert-inspired method used in the validation
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experiment for the Metric. Other survey methods were also examined in further
detail, such as those used in Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma [14] and Welner’s Depravity
Scale [78].
It is worth noting again that the free-form comments left by human raters
in the Metric survey provided great insight into their priorities and ethical thought
processes. In survey implementation, there is a clear tradeoff between the flexibility
of free-form comments and the objectivity of a quantitative scale or rank measure.
In general, quantitative measures are useful because they provide clear traceability for evaluation within a particular phase of research, while free-form comments
are useful for providing insight that can guide future phases of research.
In addition, the Metric used four scenarios in total. However, the survey
requested raters to assess the relative ethical harm of scenarios between actions, which
significantly increased their cognitive burden. Thus, each human rater was asked to
assess actions from only one pair of scenarios in order to ease their cognitive burden
and to facilitate their participation in the project. A more comprehensive survey—one
that captures assessments of a larger set of actions—would extract more information
from each rater, providing more explanatory power per survey.
The potential to compare and combine external perspectives lends a measure
of objectivity, and therefore a sense of “multiple-mindedness” or empathy, to this
research. For this particular project, military experts can provide a collective perspective from the domain of application—military affairs—while non-experts serve as
a solid basis of comparison.
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Possibly most important is the inclusion of the class of humanities experts,
which include experts in religion, ethics, and psychology, assuages several potential criticisms. Knoll states that “[v]iews on evil are inextricably linked to religious
thought,” and “nothing about training in the field of psychiatry makes the psychiatrist
an expert on matters of religion” [33]. Further, he does not condemn “philosophical
investigation into the problem of evil” [33]; and, while he claims that a scientific approach to evil would taint its nature, this project’s scientific approach in evaluating
philosophers’ assessments provides an appropriate balance between the philosophical
and scientific realm.

2.4.2

Item Response Theory (IRT) for questionnaire validation
Item Response Theory (IRT) is an alternative to classical test theory (CTT),

with emphasis on the notion that a person’s response to a survey item depends on
factors of both the test subject and the item itself. For example, an item that involves
solving a mathematical equation depends on the subject’s knowledge of mathematics,
but also the difficulty of the item itself. Equations used in IRT take forms similar to
the following:

P (Xis = 1|θs , βi , αi ) =

eαi (θs −βi )
1 − eαi (θs −βi )

That is, the probability of subject s responding in a certain manner to item
i is a function of θs , the trait level of the subject; βi , the difficulty level of the item
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(the trait level at which the individual will have a probability of 0.5 of responding in
a certain way); and αi , the discrimination of the item [56].
Overall, a more difficult item will have a lower probability of being answered
correctly than an easier item, but a subject with more knowledge of mathematics will
have a higher probability of answering a difficult item than would one who has less
knowledge. In conjunction, the chance that an individual will be able to answer a
collection of items should discern the individual’s mathematical prowess—that is, to
measure how knowledgeable the subject is on mathematics.
In Classical Test Theory (CTT), reliability is a function of observed scores,
“true scores,” and measurement error, often expressed as

[observed score] = [true score] + [measurement error].

Psychological tests are useful only “to the degree that they accurately reflect
true psychological differences” between test subjects; thus, measurement error should
be minimized.
In short, the IRT methods described above contrast with CTT, in that CTT
assumes that items are of equal difficulty and that their “sum total” is an adequate
discernment of a subjects trait. CTT focuses on the test itself, whereas IRT focuses
on the nuances behind individual items. CTT has no means by which to separate
characteristics of the test subject and of test items.
Considering IRT is essential when ethical tradeoffs—and, thereby, the survey
items that measures these tradeoffs—become increasingly difficult. The following
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presents one core ethical dilemma with four different “circumstances.” These circumstances are presented in decreasing “difficulty” (as ethical tradeoff is more clear, and
therefore less difficult, in later circumstances).
Detara has launched an attack on Calaman’s homeland; 50 million civilians’ lives were lost and moderate infrastructure damage was caused as a
result of the attack. Detara does not have sufficient resources to attack
Calaman again. Thus, there is no risk of another attack from Detara, regardless of whether Calaman attacks. Is it ethical for Calaman to retaliate
against Detara under each of the following circumstances?
1. Calaman’s attack will cause 100,000 enemy casualties and little infrastructure damage to Detara.
2. Calaman’s attack will cause 10 million enemy casualties and moderate infrastructure damage to Detara.
3. Calaman’s attack will cause 50 million enemy casualties and moderate infrastructure damage to Detara.
4. Calaman’s attack will cause 100 million enemy casualties and major
infrastructure damage to Detara.
One would expect that, if a subject responds that it is ethical for Calaman
to attack Detara in circumstance 1, then he/she would also respond the same to
circumstance 2; as the degree of damage caused by the attack increases with each
further circumstance—the ethical consequences of the attack increase, which should
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make the tradeoff more clear. That is, if the subject feels confident trading off between
the measured principles in 1, then the subject should also feel confident in making
the same tradeoff in 2, 3, and 4.1
Increasing this trade should measure the subject’s level of tradeoff—which a
trait of the subject. Moreover, the level of “difficulty” of these circumstances—a trait
of the test items—is expected to decrease. This could be used to determine whether
the level of tradeoff and the level of item difficulty are related. It could also determine
whether a survey can properly discriminate raters that trade off to differing degrees.
This model discussed here is known as the two-parameter logistic (2PL) model.
A simpler model, known as the Rasch model or 1PL model, will leave out the effect of
the discrimination factor αi by setting it to 1. Some methods use even more complex
models that use more than two item parameters—for example, a third that represents
the chance that someone can simply guess the correct answer on a multiple-choice
test.

2.4.3

Relevant statistical measures for validation and calibration
After assessments from human raters have been gathered, the model is cali-

brated against them to reach the highest possible agreement with raters.

2.4.3.1

Statistics for rater comparison

To assess agreement with experts in the Metric research, all raters were ranked
according to a “disagreement” measure. This measure was calculated as the total
1

The converse is not true—one would not necessarily expect a subject who refrains from attacking
Detara in circumstance 1 to also refrain in the other circumstances.
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difference between the responses provided by any given rater and by all experts. It
can also be expressed as a simple “percentage agreement”—the number of assessments
that the rater agrees divided by the number of responses.
More appropriate comparison statistics are available in place of this simple
disagreement measure. These include Pearson’s τ , Spearman’s ρ, Kripppendorf’s
α, Kendall’s τ series,2 and Goodman and Kruskal’s Γ statistic. Other methods to
determine inter-rater reliability are available, but only a few are in popular use [55].
The nature of the collected data naturally drives the choice of statistic to be used.
Pearson’s τ works with interval or ratio data, while the other listed statistics work with
ordinal data. Spearman’s ρ is typically used to measure agreement in the ranking of
observations. Krippendorff’s α, which “appears to be the gold standard of reliability
measurement” [73], is stable when facing small sample sizes.
Kendall’s τ and Goodman and Kruskal’s Γ are similar, with the former correcting for “ties.”

2.4.3.2

Statistical equivalence testing

Using the traditional scheme of establishing a null and alternative hypothesis
in statistical testing, where the null hypothesis is that two populations are equal,
failure to reject the null hypothesis simply means that there is not sufficient evidence
that the populations are not equal. This scheme has been increasingly regarded as
unacceptable for model validation, where the burden of proof should be shifted such
that sufficient evidence should be found that a model is valid [61].
2

This is not the same statistic as Pearson’s τ .
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Statistical equivalence testing accomplishes this. This method has a wide range
of application [61] [62] [63] [79], but is especially meaningful for model validation.
Essentially, the method reverses the typical null hypothesis, assuming that
populations under test are different and placing the burden of proof of equivalency
on the data at hand [61]. The method can be structured in a variety of ways, such as
the two one-sided test strategy (TOST) and the paired t-test of equivalence [61]. The
latter is more powerful than the former, but it requires an assumption of normality.
This assumption is suitable when comparing rankings.
The general form of the statistical equivalence test is as follows:
• H0 : µΓC1 6= µΓC2 .
Classes C1 and C2 do not perform equally.
• H 1 : µΓ C 1 = µΓ C 2 .
Classes C1 and C2 do perform equally.

2.4.3.3

Conclusions

As mentioned, the choice of rater comparison statistic relies upon the nature
of the data collected from the raters. The Likert-like data collected through the
survey process is not ratio data—in the Metric research, raters were able to assess
one action as “much more evil” or “more evil” than the other; however, “much more
evil” cannot be assumed to mean twice as much as (or some other multiple of) “more
evil.” Since the REV research uses a similar scale, Pearson’s τ can safely be removed
from consideration. In addition, Spearman’s ρ is used to measure agreement in the
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ranking of observations, and the data collected is not ranked data. Krippendorff’s α is
most applicable for experiments with small sample sizes, but this research necessarily
uses a large sample size. Kendall’s τ and Goodman and Kruskal’s Γ are very similar,
with the former correcting for “ties.” However, there is precedent for use of the Γ
statistic in working with pairwise comparisons in modeling applications [1] [52]; thus,
Γ is the most appropriate choice.
Moreover, statistical equivalence testing is a useful tool for model validation
in general.

2.5

Summary
Significant findings that drive the direction of this research are as follows:
• Defining evil, let alone analyzing and modeling the concept, is contentious and
problematic. Attempts to model evil, such as Baron-Cohen’s Empathy Quotient
and the Metric, use narrow definitions of evil that do not adequately capture
human perception of the concept.
• As an attempt to model evil, the Metric used a simuland was tangential to the
original purpose of the research. Its purpose of suggesting the more ethically
sound of two COAs invoked the phrase “lesser of two evils.” This, in turn, led to
a shift in focus to an intent to model evil itself. Models of evil may themselves
prove useful in the future; however, models of ethical harm, especially within
a particular domain, are still novel and significant but have a more apparent
clarity in scope, purpose, and relevance.
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• The trend in ethical decision models is toward complexity, but simple model
designs can be powerful. Therefore, there is promise in a simple model structure,
akin to that of Metric v0. Despite more intricate and complex approaches, such
as Metric v1 and existing ethical models’ structures, a weighted sum is useful—
especially in capturing the human assessments. However, to be useful and valid,
the model must use a refined, proper, and well-researched set of inputs into this
structure.
• Related to the above and to Figure 1.1, taken on the whole, aggregated individual moral perceptions are largely encoded into sets of ethical principles. These
sets may be explicitly codified or implicitly followed but unspoken. Ethical
principles and moral perception are not necessarily equivalent. However, the
most suitable moral perception for modeling purposes is a set of codified ethical principles, themselves aggregated with a focus on a specific domain (in the
REV’s case, military applications), and weighted by appropriate human raters.
This clarifies the scope of the REV and the direction of the REV research.
• Also related, documented sets ethical principles are relatively objective as representations of human perception of morality, as they exist externally and can
be aggregated and used as a set of defensible inputs. This approach combines
the flexibility of Metric v0 and the relative objectivity of Metric v1, at least
partially circumventing a seemingly inevitable tradeoff between the two traits.
• The survey and validation method used in Metric research was adequate, though
minor improvements could be made in assessing rater agreement. The Likert
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scale is appropriate for capturing raters’ assessments. Among rater-to-rater
comparison statistics, Goodman and Kruskal’s Γ statistic is most appropriate.
Statistical equivalence testing is one of many methods that can be used to
compare classes of raters.
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CHAPTER 3

TOWARD ASSISTED/AUTOMATED ETHICAL REASONING

If the only role of a human participant is to
watch a meter and push a button when the
needle goes from green to red, then the participation is merely symbolic. Under such
circumstances reflection and judgment are
effectively eliminated, and these are precisely the qualities that constitute the crucially important human contribution.
—Severo M. Ornstein
The concept that underlies both the Metric and REV is a decision support
model that captures ethical dilemmas as sets of equations, with weighted sums of
some quantified phenomena at their core. This chapter presents the relevance of
this REV/Metric concept—and of its future developments—to the nascent field of
machine ethics. This discussion begins with the merits and limitations of the concept
in automated ethical decision-making. The concept is then compared to that of similar
programs developed by McLaren [42] as well as Anderson and Anderson [2]. A crucial
component of this discussion is McLaren’s assertion that any tool capable of providing
ethical judgments must oversimplify its inputs in order to make ethical principles
computationally tractable [42]. The chapter then summarizes lessons derived from
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and inspired by the research and development of the Metric and REV, focusing on
the nature of designing automated ethical reasoning tools.
Significant portions of this chapter were adapted from [57], written by both
the author of this dissertation and by Dr. Nicholaos Jones.

3.1

Introduction
In November 2006, a mental health advisory team (MHAT) working for the

Office of the Surgeon General published a report assessing the mental health of combat
soldiers deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom from August 28, 2006 to October 3,
2006. Part of their report addressed the topic of battlefield ethics [43]. Some of their
findings include:
• Over 85% of Soldiers and Marines reported receiving training in how they would
treat non-combatants, yet 33% of Marines and 29% of Soldiers did not agree
that their commanding officers made it clear not to mistreat non-combatants.
• Only 47% of Soldiers and only 38% of Marines agreed that non-combatants
should be treated with dignity and respect, while 17% from each group agreed
that all non-combatants should be treated as insurgents.
• Well over a third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be allowed,
whether to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine or to obtain important
information about insurgents.
• 28% of Soldiers and 31% of Marines reported facing ethical situations in which
they did not know how to respond.
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Since MHAT developed its survey questions from scratch, by virtue of never before
having been tasked with an ethics assessment and failing to find relevant questions
in their search of the scientific literature, there is no basis with which to compare
their findings. However, even without being able to compare these results to other
surveys, their findings suggest that there is room for ethical improvement among
soldiers and marines during wartime situations. MHAT recommends that soldiers be
given battlefield ethics training and that behavioral health professionals serving the
soldiers incorporate battlefield ethics into their counseling activities, especially when
the soldiers are deployed in a combat theatre [43].
Commenting on MHAT’s report, Arkin [3] argues that autonomous robots,
at some point, will be able to perform more ethically than human soldiers during
combat situations. Among his reasons are that robotic sensors for battlefield observations can surpass the capacities of human observation, and robotic processors can
interpret those observations more quickly than humans; that robots, unlike humans,
can be designed without emotions and anger that produce poor judgment; and that
robots, unlike humans, can be designed to avoid confirmation bias, distorting new
information so that it fits only pre-existing beliefs. While Arkin does not maintain
that autonomous robots could be ethically perfect, he does infer that they could be
ethically superior to human soldiers in combat situations.
One alternative to replacing or supplementing human soldiers with autonomous
robotic warriors in order to improve ethical outcomes during combat situations is to
remove human soldiers from combat situations by using remote-monitored telerobots
such as drones (see [65]). These robots are not capable of acting autonomously, requir77

ing human operators to command their actions. The MHAT report notes that handling dead bodies and human remains increases the mistreatment of non-combatants
by soldiers [43], and that and that soldiers with high levels of anger are twice as
likely as soldiers with low levels of anger to engage in unethical behavior in combat situations [43]. Moreover, Mitchell found that a person’s judgments regarding
the hostility of others affect their rating of the comparative suitability of actions as
means to ends [46].
One might infer from this that removing soldiers from situations that cause
anger or exposure to casualties of war should decrease unethical behaviors. Sullins,
however, argues that removing human soldiers from combat situations apparently
tends to increase unethical behaviors, confounding ethical decision making by making
it more difficult for soldiers to access morally relevant situational information [71].
This is problematic only insofar as robots do not act autonomously. For example,
a recent test with drones demonstrates the possibility of autonomous robotics, with
autonomous aircraft coordinating information to identify a ground target. The test
laid the groundwork for scientific advances that would allow drones to search for
a human target and then make an identification based on facial-recognition or other
software. Once a match was made, a drone could launch a missile to kill the target [21].
Since developing autonomously operating robotic systems is one of the priorities of the U.S. military [68], the primary ethical challenge for autonomous robotics
is designing software that allows the robots to make ethical decisions.
A second alternative to replacing or supplementing human soldiers with autonomous robotic warriors in order to improve ethical outcomes during combat situa78

tions is to provide human soldiers with support tools for ethical decision-making. This
support would come in the form of software that presents human soldiers with morally
salient information, taking advantage of the capacities that Arkin claims would make
robotic soldiers superior to human ones: advanced perceptual and computational
powers, reasoning unclouded by emotion, and judgment that is not biased by preexisting beliefs. Unlike drones, this alternative has yet to be field-tested. Moreover,
even if providing support tools to human soldiers does not increase levels of ethical
behavior during combat, developing software capable of processing ethically relevant
information is a prerequisite for designing fully autonomous robotic soldiers.
A tool embodying the REV/Metric concept offers a way for commanders to
explore the ethical implications of potential actions, allowing them to execute and
re-execute the tools programming with different inputs, then continue interacting
iteratively with the tool in order to seek the most ethically viable solutions. Thus, the
tool has the potential to lead to fewer casualties and other ethical hardships, validate
that a commander’s decision took morality into account, and, perhaps, produce more
effective military actions.
The concept is not intended to assist soldiers with real-time ethical decisionmaking, nor is it designed to direct decisions of autonomous robotic systems. However,
it is a necessary step in those directions, and, as a case study, it highlights some of the
significant limitations that support tools for ethical decision-making must address.
For this reason, the development of the Metric and REV serves as a relevant and
interesting case study about how to design robotic systems that have the capacity to
reason about morality. Moreover, a longer-range hope for the REV/Metric concept,
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based upon its quantitative nature, is that it be developed into a software tool and
integrated with other COA analysis tools, thereby contributing to commanders a
holistic picture of the constraints on their decisions.
This discussion of the REV/Metric concept, however, does also provide reasons to be cautious with respect to developments in these directions and to exercise
responsibility in developing and using tools around them.

3.2

Limitations of the underlying concept
Although the results of this research suggest that the REV/Metric approach

is viable, there are still boundaries around the approach as a decision support tool
for ethical decision-making. These limitations include the moral relativity, reliability,
authority, and objectivity of the assessments of models that take this approach.

3.2.1

Relativity of judgment
Neither the Metric nor the REV is unable to generate “absolute” ethical judg-

ments about a given COA—both models evaluate COAs relative to one another.
Therefore, they cannot capture whether an action that is more reprehensible than
another can still be considered absolutely morally impermissible. However, given
that their domain of application is in decision analysis, wherein one is to compare
COAs and select one, they are not intended to explore this problem.
Because they are limited to a specific subject domain as well (in this case,
military decision analysis), their inputs include factors thought to be ethically relevant
to the situation at hand; their central equations are calibrated to conform to expert
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human judgments but not explicitly based upon codes or principles that support those
judgments.
Developing a more robust and generalizable tool requires either finding a way
to mathematize moral codes—or finding paradigm cases of morally permissible and
impermissible actions to which potential COAs can be compared. Such cases would
support inferences from comparative moral judgments to absolute moral judgments
in much the same way that, were the world Newtonian, information about reference
frames that are stationary relative to absolute space would support inferences about
the absolute state of motion of objects. For any action less evil than a paradigm case
of a morally permissible action is morally permissible, and any action at least as evil
as a paradigm case of a morally impermissible action is morally impermissible.
The challenge is to identify the paradigm cases themselves. This requires identifying actions that experts tend to judge similarly, and which also permit meaningful
comparisons to the COAs of interest to users. Because the Belmont Report [49] identifies paradigm cases of this sort from the realm of bioethics, it seems that there is no
a priori reason to suppose that such cases do not exist in the realm of military ethics.
If such cases can be found, the absolute moral judgments they help to support would
increase the REV/Metric approach’s range of application, helping military commanders to decide not merely which COA is more ethically viable but also whether to
pursue any considered COA or, instead, search for more options.
A related boundary on the REV/Metric concept is that the judgments it produces are calibrated toward some specific baseline morality. This is intentional. Because the Metric itself was intended to support American military operations, and
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since the goal of the REV is similar (but more general), the Metric and REV are
both essentially designed as models “of the ethical values of the analyst using the
tool or of the society considering the COAs being evaluated” [54]. Accordingly, while
the models’ ultimate output takes the form “Action A is more ethically viable than
action B,” there is an implicit qualification to this output, namely, “relative to a
particular system of morality.” As noted, the design permits flexibility in choosing
appropriate consequences (or other inputs) and calibrating to a baseline for any given
system. Moreover, if the goal of automated ethical decision-making is to produce a
robot capable of making non-relativized judgments about morality (whether absolute
or comparative), further research is required to determine whether there is some sort
of universal baseline morality relative to which a model embodying the REV/Metric
concept can be calibrated.

3.2.2

Objectivity and perceived authority
More pressing are concerns on the objectivity of a tool using the REV/Metric

concept and, as perceived by end users, the authority of the assessments that such a
tool can generate. As Bell notes,
A system which simply says “do this” or “the answer is 42” without any
justification or explanation is unlikely to find acceptance. If the user can
see why the system produced the results it did, then acceptance is much
easier [8].
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Unlike other ethical support tools such as McLaren’s Truth-Teller and SIROCCO
programs, neither the Metric nor the REV is equipped to provide an explanation for
its output to an end user. They simply take a set of inputs, execute a series of equations using those inputs, and determine as output which of a set of COAs it determines
to be more ethically sound. Thus, the only “explanation” that a tool embodying the
REV/Metric concept can provide of its output is the set of equations themselves,
documentation from the developers of the tool, and the set of consequences’ weights
and other input parameters specified. This provides some mathematical traceability,
but not a sufficiently thorough explanation for its ethical evaluations. Accordingly,
even if its assessment is confirmed to be “accurate” (whether validated by comparison
to another similar model or to a panel of experts aside from those used in any model
calibration experiment), in practice it is still likely to lack an authority as something
upon which humans should base their decisions.
Another related limitation on the REV/Metric concept concerns the objectivity of its judgments. Subjectivity necessarily remains in the categorization of inputs.
For example, Metric v0 requires analysts to provide estimates for harms along a Harm
Index which indicates increases in harm severity. This version also requires analysts
to provide an estimate of Hardships and Sufferings. Analysts must further rate each
consequence of an action according to an “Order of Evil”—analysts decide whether
each consequence is Necessary, Consequential, Selfish, or Malicious. While each of
these categories along the Harm Index and the Order of Evil are defined, there is some
inherent subjectivity present in categorizing harms based upon these definitions. This
subjectivity provides a great amount of flexibility. This subjectivity is useful, insofar
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as it allows analysts to incorporate context to a certain extent (an action committed
in self-defense might be seen as more ethical than the same action committed with no
such context or justifiability). However, an analyst could, consciously or not, project
personal biases into categorizations that deem certain consequences to be necessary
and others to be malicious, essentially justifying biased decisions by pointing to the
results of a tool’s analysis. Hence, if not properly framed, subjectivity can lead to
inconsistency in results or, worse, allow a REV/Metric-like tool to be used improperly
in a way that justifies unreasonable or immoral actions.

3.3

Responsibilities of designers and users
The REV and Metric can both generate a comparative judgment of the rela-

tive ethical harm of two COAs, where the judgment is relative to a particular baseline
morality, insensitive to contextual factors, and potentially biased by a degree of subjectivity from its inputs. This kind of output might prove to be useful for standalone
applications or as part of a mechanism for reasoning in combat machines. Even if
these outputs are not treated as guidance for ethical decision-making, they might
serve as useful prompts for military analysts to reconsider decisions prior to action
when those decisions conflict with a tool’s output or to further explore the ethical
“space” surrounding their potential COAs. They may also help to direct the attention
of decision-makers to unnoticed or underappreciated ethical factors.
Some are inclined believe the assessments of a computer program unquestioningly. Here, the danger is not that such users will fail to trust the output, but
that they will trust that output without careful thought [8]. Thus, if its outputs
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prove to be useful in some way, its limitations must be well-understood by users if
it is to provide actionable results. If users misunderstand its conceptual framework,
misinterpret its output, or blindly use its output without tempering it through an
application of their own ethical judgments, it has the potential to justify completely
immoral actions. Moreover, given Morrow’s poignant reservations about classifying
and quantifying evil, the limitations inherent in any attempt to quantify and scientifically evaluate evil should be made absolutely clear before people use tools that such
attempts produce. Responsibility falls on both the designers and the users to ensure
that it is used properly. While users must not implement and deploy a tool based
upon the REV/Metric concept in an irresponsible way, the designer of such a tool
should also make its limitations clear to the users.
It is often difficult to convey to users the appropriate level of confidence warranted in the tool’s output. Users seem to be to inclined toward innately, and naively,
interpreting output that provides a “go/no-go” response or reduces a forecast to a
simple “green/red” display as an absolutely certain conclusion.
A valid point of hesitation is that an ethical model may remove the “humanin-the-loop.” The author of this dissertation shares this sentiment, having previously
expressed that decision support tools should not make final decisions on life-critical
applications and that users of these tools must utilize the tools’ outcomes responsibly. The author has further stated that “if we reduce [...] decision-making to a
mere push of a button when [...] software shows an undesirable outcome, we have
effectively taken the [expert]—and his or her extensive experience and capacity for
reasoning—out of the equation” [59], a philosophy that would apply greatly to a
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quantitative ethical modeling tool implemented as an end product for military commanders. Other designers of ethical models and frameworks, such as McLaren [40],
share this sentiment as well.
Related, while military technology is indeed progressing toward the proliferation of automated drones, large-scale weaponry, and other potentially intelligent and
capable mechanisms, and while Morrow shares a well-founded ethical sentiment that
“hardware [outperforms conscience]” and that “‘[c]an’ outruns ’should’ ” [47], the
REV/Metric concept is intended merely to help frame military capability, technology, and action in a meaningful way—not to condemn the advancement of military
technology in general.

3.4

Conclusions
There is every indication from the U.S. government that developing autonomously

operating robotic systems for military applications is a high priority for the near future [77]. Given that the U.S. Army provided funding for the initial research on
the Metric, there is good reason to suppose that those involved in military operations
planning have identified a need for models that properly frame ethical concerns in military contexts. These models potentially include support tools for operation planning,
to be implemented for providing decision-making guidance to military commanders.
Eventually, they also might include tools for use during military engagements, to identify ethical constraints in the reasoning and decision-making processes of automated
robotic systems that have identified potential targets.
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The concept behind the Metric and REV is relevant as a case study for the
assumptions and challenges involved in designing and implementing a support tool
for ethical decision-making, especially in military contexts. Undoubtedly, the concept
requires improvement before it is robust enough to produce a tool that provides
responsible ethical guidance for operation planning, much less a tool that responsibly
automates ethical decision making in robotic systems. For the moment, however, the
research described in this dissertation demonstrates the possibility of developing a
tool that supports military commanders or autonomous robotic systems in making
ethical judgments. Moreover, some preliminary results of implementing the original
Metric as a tool highlight the importance of developing computable criteria that allow
robotic systems to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. This topic should
be explored rigorously and extensively before deeming any implementation of the
concept of a quantitative ethical model—whether based upon the Metric, the REV,
or any future development—ready for widespread use on the battlefield.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

When it is obvious that the goals cannot be
reached, don’t adjust the goals, adjust the
action steps.
—Confucius
This chapter describes the methodology undertaken in this research for each
aspect of the project.

4.1

Design REV model
As discussed in Section 2.3, simple linear models can produce significant re-

sults, so long as a proper set of inputs is chosen. This concept greatly influences the
design of REV—the model returns to a simple formulation, more akin to Metric v0’s
pure weighted summation than to Metric v1’s more complex model.
Like the Metric, the REV produces an ethical comparison between two COAs.
Internally, however, the REV differs in that it frames internal calculations in terms of
ethical violation rather than evil, itself decomposed as violations of partcular ethical
principles. To emphasize this shift in focus, this model assesses COAs based upon a
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Delta Violation (∆V ), rather than a Delta Goodness:

∆VAB =

np
X

(vBj − vAj )wj

j=1

where np is the number of ethical principles considered, w1 ...wn are the relative weights
of those principles, and vAj and vBj is the extent to which COAs A and B, respectively,
violate a given principle j. Essentially, wi is a measure of how important adherence
to a given principle is to avoiding overall ethical harm, relative to other principles.
The REV then assesses the two COAs as follows:
if ∆VAB < 0 then return COA A
else if ∆VAB > 0 then return COA B
else if ∆VAB = 0 then return null
end if

4.2

Choose input principles for REV
As mentioned, the set of inputs used by the REV are coded as a set of princi-

ples. This section outlines the process of choosing appropriate principles for this set.
Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 provide sufficient background for the nature of ethical
harm, traits that are commonly understood to underly ethical harm, and specific sets
of ethical principles espoused by moral philosophers and psychologists.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, Just War Theory is rich in history and very
much applicable to this research. In addition, Ross’s prima facie duties [64] concisely
capture many of the same sentiments embodied in other sets of principles—including
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some incorporated by the United States military [76], espoused by other philosophers
[44] [32], highlighted by religious organizations [74]. These sources form the basis of
the set of inputs to be used to test the REV.1
Table 4.1 presents a “clustering” of principles present in key principle sets.
Several sets of principles, such as those detailed in Section 2.2.2, were evaluated for
importance and relevance. The sets were then examined to identify principles that
were equivalent (or at least very similar).2
Following are the sets chosen:
• Ross’s prima facie duties [64], chosen to represent general sets of ethical principles.
• Gillon’s set of principles of medical ethics [24], chosen to represent a set used
in an outside domain.
• U.S. Law of Armed Conflict [18], chosen as a set used inside the domain of
study (military). In addition, this set is also relatively modern and used by the
U.S. military, the intended user and perspective behind the tool.
• Just War Theory (as summarized in [20] for simplicity, but also invoked in [19],
[74], [75], and [48]), chosen as another set of military principles. This set is
more general and historically-based than the LOAC.
1

As stated, the set of principles can be modified to match other “baseline moralities” or specific
codes for other domains of application.
2
It is worth noting that several of the sets that were not chosen as “key” sets also contained
several of these principles.
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Table 4.1: Analysis of principle sets’ intersections
Principle

Score

Prima facie

Medical

LOAC

Just War

Weight: 1

Weight: 1

Weight: 2

Weight: 2

Nonmaleficence

Distinction
(between civilians/combatants
and lawful/unlawful
targets)

Discrimination

Self-defense
criteria: Proportionality

Proportionality

Nonmaleficence
toward
civilians

6

Nonmaleficence

Proportionality

5

Justice

Necessity

4

Self-defense
criteria:
Necessity

Last resort

Prospect of
success

4

Probability of
success

Reasonable
chance of
success

Proper
authority

3

Beneficence

2

Beneficence

Beneficence

Nonmaleficence
toward
combatants

2

Nonmaleficence

Nonmaleficence

Fidelity

1

Fidelity

Selfimprovement

1

Selfimprovement

Reciprocity

1
1
1

Reciprocity

Gratitude
Autonomy

Legitimate
authority

Legitimate
authority

Gratitude
Autonomy

The table also provides the term that each set uses for every principle—for
example, “Non-maleficence toward civilians” is termed “Discrimination” in Just War
doctrines. If a principle is not present in a given set, the corresponding cell is empty.
Next to each principle set listed in the table’s header is the set’s weighting.
The third and fourth sets are given twice as much weight as the first and second,
since they specifically involve ethics in the military domain. If the principle is present
in a given set, then that set’s weight is added to the principle’s total “score.” For
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example, the principle of Proportionality is present in Ross’s prima facie duties (1),
the LOAC (2), and Just War (2); its score is therefore 1 + 2 + 2 = 5. The principles
were then sorted by their total score, and those with more than half of the maximum
score (1/2 × 6 = 3) determined to be most relevant and thus selected as model inputs.
Following is a summary of the ethical principles chosen:3
• p1 . Non-maleficence toward civilians. This principle involves conducting actions
that avoid harm—especially intentional harm—to civilians.4
• p2 . Necessity. This principle states that the COA should be necessary and, in
the case of most military COAs, that other means for an attempt at peace have
not been fruitful.
• p3 . Proportionality. Since the goal of military COA is typically to restore peace
with an aggressor [74], this principle ensures that the actor does not cause
damage well above and beyond that caused by the aggressor.
• p4 . Prospect of success. This principle indicates that one should not fight for a
“lost cause.”
Table 4.2, presented as an aside, details which of these principles is (arguably)
connected to empathy—described as an innate and important factor in Section 2.1.3.1.
The table also states which inputs to Metric v0 and v1, if any, capture the principle.
This table suggests that empathy indeed underlies many ethical principles. It also
3

These principles are not enumerated in the same order as Table 4.1.
Essentially, this principle captures the result of the Metric research—as, when calibrated, the
Metric reported intentional harm to civilians as the overwhelmingly dominant ethical factor.
4
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Table 4.2: Principles and their connections to empathy and previous versions of the
model
Principle

Empathy

Metric v0

Metric v1
Non-combatant
casualties,
Non-combatant
hardships, Friendly
infrastructure damage,
Enemy infrastructure
damage, Neutral
infrastructure damage

Non-maleficence
toward civilians

X

All Intent/Harm pairs

Proportionality

X

All Necessary Harms

Necessity

All Necessary Harms

Prospect of success
Proper authority
Beneficence

X

Non-maleficence
toward combatants

X

Fidelity

X

All Intent/Harm pairs

Friendly force
casualties, Enemy
force casualties
All “Moral, ethical,
and legal
considerations”

Self-improvement
Reciprocity
Gratitude
Autonomy

X
X
X

suggests that neither version of the Metric properly captures or decomposes ethical
harm as identified in key sets of principles.5
5

In this principle scoring analysis, none of the principles chosen embody qualities that essentially
“go above and beyond the call of duty”—that is, actively doing good in addition to avoiding harm to
others. For example, Ross’s principles include non-injury and beneficence [64], the former a principle
to avoid violating in order to avoid harm, and the latter to adhere to in order to proliferate good
(or benefit). It can, however, be argued that ‘avoiding harm’ and ‘proliferating good’ are one in
the same—that, for example, failure to volunteer in service of a disadvantaged party can be seen as
being complicit in their disadvantage—thus removing the difference between the two sets.
The REV is able to incorporate both types of principles, and doing so could arguably make the
model more comprehensive. However, the principles that are useful for this specific application—
military COA analysis—are largely those that involve avoiding harm. In addition, ‘beneficial’ principles would likely significantly outweigh those that merely seek to avoid harm. Therefore, if the
REV incorporated ‘beneficial’ principles, the weighting of its principles would produce a model that
would not be as useful for military decision-making as a model that excluded them. Other domains
of application for the REV, however, may benefit from including such principles.
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4.3

Design scenarios for validation/calibration process
The Metric’s validation process intended to include hypothetical scenarios

alongside historical scenarios; however, they were ultimately dropped due to time
constraints [54]. This research, however, uses only hypothetical military scenarios for
the validation process. While hypothetical scenarios must be typical of scenarios that
military decision-makers may face in order to maintain realism and context, they do
allow for a great amount of creative flexibility. This is important in developing a
method that exercises tradeoffs between model inputs. Actors in these scenarios can
also be anonymized, mitigating cultural and affiliatory biases that would be associated
with real historical events.
In the Metric research, scenarios were developed to exercise as many of Metric
v0’s and Metric v1’s inputs as possible. However, they did not cover all of the models’
inputs, and categorization of inputs involved a relatively subjective (but thoroughly
documented and rigorously defended) rationale [54]. In this research, each scenario
sets set the stage for a tradeoff between two particular principles. The entire set of
scenarios is constructed to exercise the inputs of both the REV and Metric v1—the
scenarios trade off between principles but also include numerical figures related to
tangible consequences. This allows the two models to be calibrated and compared.
Since four principles were chosen to define inputs to the model, there are six
possible combinations of pairwise comparisons between principles:

 
n!
n
=
k
k!(n − k)!
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4
4!
=6
=
2!(4 − 2)!
2
Thus, six scenarios, each contraposing one pair of principles, are used in this
research.
For example, Scenario 1 contains two COAs, with COA A violating principle
p1 and COA B violating principle p2 . The scenario is written to leave the other two
principles out of the situation as much as possible while still maintaining necessary realism. The scenarios and their associated descriptions, context, COAs, and statistics
are loosely inspired by particular events that occurred during and after World War II,
with two of the events that directly inspired these scenarios ongoing (as of December
2013). The scenarios cover conventional warfare, asymmetrical warfare, and actions
from several different perspectives. Thus, the scenarios are written to capture relatively modern military operations to maintain relevance, but also to cover a variety
of actions to test the flexibility of the model.
Table 4.3 provides a brief synopsis of each scenario, while complete descriptions
and information can be found in Appendix A. For each scenario, the rater is provided
with the title, the context (or “Situation”), a description of two courses of action
(internally marked as COA A and B, respectively), and a Likert scale choice between
the two.6 Also associated with each scenario, but hidden from the rater, is the
information about the principle violated by each COA, the tangible consequences
associated with each COA, and a measure of intent associated with each consequence.
6

As explained in detail in a later section, the survey mechanism randomizes the order of the
scenarios, the order of the actions presented in each scenario, and the names of the countries involved
in each scenario.
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Table 4.3: A brief description of all scenarios used in the validation process, including
COAs and the principles each violates. Refer to Appendix A for more complete
descriptions of each scenario.
Scenario 1: Intercontinental warfare
Inspiration: World War II, U.S. vs. Japan, 1945

COA

Violated principle

A. Discontinuing a submarine blockade
B. Continuing a submarine blockade

p1 . Civilian non-maleficence
p2 . Necessity

Scenario 2: The border encroachment
Inspiration: India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir province, ongoing

COA

Violated principle

A. Using a ground assault
B. Using an air strike

p1 . Civilian non-maleficence
p3 . Proportionality

Scenario 3: Stabilization
Inspiration: U.S. operations in Afghanistan, ongoing

COA

Violated principle

A. Launching an urban sweep
B. Continuing rural patrols

p1 . Civilian non-maleficence
p4 . Prospect of success

Scenario 4: The archipelago
Inspiration: Sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, Falklands War, 1982

COA

Violated principle

A. Sinking a transport
B. Sinking an escorting warship

p2 . Necessity
p3 . Proportionality

Scenario 5: Last-dich offensive
Inspiration: The Battle of the Bulge, World War II, 1944–1945

COA

Violated principle

A. Launching a counter-offensive
B. Surrendering unconditionally

p2 . Necessity
p4 . Prospect of success

Scenario 6: Merchant ship crew recovery
Inspiration: SS Mayaguez Incident, Southeast Asia, 1975

COA

Violated principle

A. Seizing a ship and negotiating
B. Launching a military recovery operation

p3 . Proportionality
p4 . Prospect of success
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The consequences and the actor’s intent are used as inputs to the Metric (li /hi
and mi , respectively, for input i) for the primary experiment (which compares the
REV and Metric to one another and to other raters). An intent is encoded as 1.0 if
the actor intends to directly cause that consequence as an objective of the COA, 0.5
if it is consequential but still a direct result of the actor’s action, and 0.25 if it is in
the form of potential retaliation by the opposing force.

4.4

Develop survey software system and collect human raters’ responses
The survey software system is a tool designed to present scenario information

to human raters and to collect their responses and other pertinent information. This
section first discusses the design of the survey software and the interface between the
raters and the system. Then, the pilot survey used to test the software, the ergonomics
of the interface, and the cognitive load of the survey are discussed. Finally, the nature
of the set of survey items presented to raters is given in detail.

4.4.1

Design and process of the survey software mechanism
The survey software system contains two components: the survey website

and the underlying database. The survey website is explicitly presented to human
raters. It collects their responses to the scenarios via survey, their self-classification of
their own expertise, and optional demographic information. The underlying database
contains two tables: the scenario table and the rater response table. The survey table
stores data about each scenario (as presented in Appendix A), which the survey
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website uses to populate the survey in real time, and the rater response table stores
information provided by raters back to the survey website.
The survey used in the Metric research was written in Microsoft Word for
expediency. However, web-based packages have significant advantages, including automatic generation of tests and gathering of results. Moreover, the author has extensive knowledge of relevant web development technologies such as PHP, HTML, and
MySQL and has led related efforts, such as the creation of the Certified Modeling
and Simulation Professional (CMSP) examination software outlined in [53].
Thus, the mechanism is written in PHP7 server-side scripting language. It is
often used for website development, and, in fact, can generate web pages in “realtime” when users access the PHP script via web browser.8 PHP naturally interfaces
with the MySQL (My Structured Query Language) table management system, which
houses the mechanism’s tables. The Apache HTTP web server application powers
the ultimate interface provided to the end user, and the survey mechanism is housed
on a Linux-based server. The mechanism is housed on the www.uah.edu web domain,
as using the university’s domain name is convenient for this research and instills user
confidence in the reliability and legitimacy of the survey.
Figure 4.1 shows how the components of the validation survey mechanism
interact. The mechanism writes to the rater response table twice for each rater: once
when he/she responds to the descisions for the scenarios and again if he/she chooses
to supply optional demographic information. This allows the rater to close the survey
7

A recursive acronym, PHP stands for PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor.
Later steps in the validation process take advantage of the fact that PHP scripts can also be
executed via command-line interface.
8
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START

Scenario
table

“Welcome”
page

Rater
response
table

“Scenarios
and
decisions”
page

Human
rater

“Optional
demographic
information”
page

END

Figure 4.1: Interaction between various components of the validation survey mechanism.

immediately after providing scenario assessments without losing information provided
by the rater.
Upon visiting the survey website, the website first presents the rater with
a “Welcome” page with text explaining the purpose of the survey, their role in the
research project, assurance of privacy and anonymity, and contact information for the
author and for the UAHuntsville Institutional Review Board chair. The page then
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provides a “Next” button, which takes the rater to the “Scenarios and decisions” page
where they provide their most pertinent information—responses to the six scenarios
and their self-classification of their expertise.
On this page, the survey website extracts data from all six scenarios from
the scenario table, then presents the rater with each of the scenarios’ “Scenario as
provided to rater” information in Section 4.3. The information is accompanied by a
set of HTML radio buttons that allow the rater to make a choice between COAs.
The PHP script that powers the website allows for a great amount of control
over how the website is presented to the rater. The script randomizes many aspects
of how information is presented to raters, eliminating several biases that may bias
raters. These randomizations are as follows:
• The scenarios themselves are presented in random order. (However, the top
scenario is labeled “Scenario 1 of 6,” the second as “Scenario 2 of 6,” and so on
to, in effect, provide the rater with a “progress bar” for the survey.)
• The descriptions of the actions for each scenario are presented in random order.
For consistency and clarity, the COA that was presented first is also presented
first under the “Decision” block first. That is, if COA B was presented first, then
the first choice presented to the rater would be “B is clearly ethically preferable,” and the last choice presented would be “A is clearly ethically preferable.”
• The names of the countries, listed as “Red” and “Blue” in the scenario descriptions for parsability, are changed to random names. These are chosen from
Green, Purple, Violet, Turquoise, Cyan, Chartreuse, Pink, Indigo, Orange, Ma100

roon, Azure, Amethyst, Olive, and Cerulean. The same country name is never
used in more than one scenario, making raters aware that the scenarios presented to them are completely independent from one another.
• For self-classification of expertise, the description for either humanities expert
or military expert is randomly presented first, with the other presented second.
The description for non-expert is always presented last.
This information is presented differently every time any rater accesses the page;
however, the underlying script is designed to record the raters’ responses consistently
in the rater response table.
In addition, the names of the expert classes themselves—“humanities expert”
and “military expert”—are hidden from the raters; thus, raters classify themselves
based solely upon descriptions provided to them. This is in part because some prepilot raters indicated that they did not consider themselves to hold significant expertise when they would fit under the author’s own definition of an “expert”; others were
quick to label themselves as experts despite not holding the credentials sought in this
study. Humanities and military expertise, respectively, are described as follows to the
rater:
• I hold an advanced degree in philosophy, psychology, political science, history,
ethics, or a related field; or I hold a position as a religious leader or another
similar position; or I hold a position as a counselor, social worker, clinical psychologist, or in other related work.
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• I have specific training or experience, gained in military service; or am an active,
retired, military civilian, government civilian, or reserve component personnel.
The PHP script includes JavaScript code that ensures that the rater must
respond to all six scenario decisions and their self-classification before continuing.
Once all responses are provided, this page’s “Next” button first records the rater’s
responses in the rater response table, then takes the rater to the “Optional demographic information” page. This page first thanks the rater for their participation,
then provides them the option of providing additional information about themselves.
Since the rater’s “required” information is already recorded at this point, the rater
may navigate away from the website without compromising their responses.
If the rater decides to continue, they are presented with several questions
regarding basic demographics and their military service, intended for further analysis
across various demographics, such as age, if adequate sample size allows. These
questions are either multiple-choice or short-answer. All multiple-choice questions
have an “I don’t want to specify” option, which is selected by default, and all shortanswer responses are blank by default.
Once the user presses the “Finish” button on the bottom of this page, the
survey website updates the rater’s existing record with the additional demographic
information provided (thereby tying their responses to this new information) and
thanks the user again for their support.
The survey website has two additional hidden features, “debug mode” and
“fixed mode,” intended primarily for use by researchers. In “debug mode,” all in-
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formation about each scenario, including the principles violated by and consequences
associated with each COA, is displayed on the website; in “fixed mode,” the scenarios,
actions, countries, and self-classifications are not randomized. Both modes may be
active at the same time.
To preserve anonymity, the validation survey mechanism does not record the
raters’ contact information or names. It does, however, record the following additional
information for each rater:
• A unique ID for the rater, generated by the software and used only internally.
• Two Boolean flags indicating whether or not the rater was in “debug mode”
or “fixed mode.” These flags are recorded primarily for testing purposes, as
neither mode is active for rater assessments collected and used in this research.
• IP address. This is used only to help indicate (but not necessarily determine)
whether any rater has taken the survey more than once.
• Time and date that the rater arrived at the “Scenarios and decisions” page
and that the rater submitted his/her scenario responses (“time started” and
“time completed,” respectively). The window encompassed by these times does
not count time spent on the “Welcome” page or time spent filling demographic
information. Collectively, these records allow an analysis on the frequency of
responses over time. They also provide a rough measure of how much time
each rater spent on the survey, useful for determining the cognitive load of the
survey.
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Appendix B provides detailed information on the text and questions provided
to the rater throughout the survey process, including the optional demographic
questions.

4.4.2

Pilot test of survey software and process
A pilot test was conducted to ensure that the survey website recorded responses

correctly, presented an intuitive interface, and used comprehensible scenarios. For
this test, a link to the survey was sent to several contacts in all three categories—
humanities experts, military experts, and non-experts. Respondents were not made
aware that they were part of a pilot study. Overall, there was an overwhelming
response—97 submissions were received over a two-week period, with 41 military
experts, 15 humanities experts, and 40 non-experts providing responses.
The following conclusions were drawn from this test:
• Respondents spent an average of 15 minutes, 29 seconds on the Scenarios and
decisions page, indicating an adequate amount of cognitive load and attention
paid to the survey.
• Overall, the results of the pilot indicated that neither the survey nor the scenarios needed to be modified before actual data was collected.
The data collected in the pilot was used solely to test the validation process
and was not used in the final analysis.

104

4.4.3

Collection of rater responses for analysis
Since the pilot test indicated that the survey did not need to be modified, the

data collection process was similar to the pilot test—a link to the survey was widely
distributed, and the survey mechanism recorded rater responses. Section B.2 shows
the email sent to many of the potential respondents.
Human raters were solicited from a variety of sources. Collection of nonexperts from local and non-local sources, including from outside of the United States,
was straightforward. To collect expert assessments, personal contacts with expertise
in military and humanities were polled first. Then, contacts at the nearby, contacts
at the nearby Redstone Arsenal United States Army post and within the University
of Alabama in Huntsville College of Liberal Arts faculty were polled. These contacts
were also requested to disseminate the survey among their own contacts—many of
these had their own set of contacts from which to draw more experts. The search
pool was then extended to faculty and contacts at other universities, especially those
with strong philosophy departments and focused Centers for Applied Ethics, within
the United States. Many universities outside of the United States were also solicited.
In total, the author directly contacted over 1,000 respondents, with several others
indirectly contacted. 141 responded overall.
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4.5

Integrate model, chosen principles, and scenarios for validation
This section follows directly from the previous sections, combining the model

designed, principles chosen, and scenarios developed. It discusses how the particular
sets of principles and actions affects the model as used in this validation experiment.
Four key principles were chosen among the many principles available, as discussed in Section 4.2. For np = 4, the model expression given in Section 4.1 becomes

∆VAB =

np
X

(vBj − vAj )wj

j=1

= (vB1 − vA1 )w1 + (vB2 − vA2 )w2 +
(vB3 − vA3 )w3 + (vB4 − vA4 )w4

Each scenario in this validation experiment presents two COAs. Moreover,
each COA violates one particular principle; thus, the model’s evaluation of the two
COAs in a given scenario depends only on those two principles. In addition, while
the model design allows an action to violate a principle to some degree (as a given vij
can take on any real number value), any specific vij value would require justification
in order to bring it out of the subjective realm. Thus, this experiment opts to discard
any additional information that a principle’s degree of violation would provide;9 for
this experiment, vij = 1 if COA i violates principle j, and vij = 0 if it does not.10
9

In addition, whether or not a principle can be violated to some degree, rather than absolutely,
is another unsolved philosophical inquiry.
10
As a consequence of this, item “difficulty” of the kind exemplified in Section 2.4.2 does not apply
and, therefore, IRT becomes less relevant in this survey design.
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This further simplifies the model’s evaluation of the COAs provided in a scenario. For example, in Scenario 2 (which trades off between p1 and p3 ), COA A
violates p1 and COA B violates p3 . By design, p2 and p4 are not violated by either
action. Thus, the expression for VA2 B2 , the Delta Violation of Scenario 2’s COAs A
and B, simplifies to

∆VA2 B2 = (0 − 1)w1 + (0 − 0)w2 +
(1 − 0)w3 + (0 − 0)w4
= w3 − w1

A negative value for VA2 B2 would indicate that the rater prefers COA A over COA B
in Scenario 2—and, in turn, that the rater prefers violating principle p1 over p3 (or,
conversely, adhering to p3 over p1 ). A positive value would indicate the opposite. A
value of 0 would indicate that the rater has no significant preference for either COA,
which can arise if the rater weighs the principles associated with the two actions
equally.
In general, for a scenario j,

∆VAj Bj = wpAj − wpBj

where pA is the principle violated by COA A and pB by COA B in the scenario.
That is, in this experiment, the ∆V between a scenario’s two actions simplifies to the
difference between the weights of the principles violated by those actions.
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4.6

Develop validation procedure
The validation procedure involves the integrated model, principles, and sce-

narios. It is most simply outlined as follows:
1. Generate or calculate candidate REV weights.
2. Generate random raters and Metric.
3. Randomly set aside half of all experts as the set of “standard” raters.
4. Group all other raters—the remaining experts, all non-experts, the models, and
the random raters—together as the set of “contestant” raters.
5. Compare each contestant rater to every standard rater, calculating a Γ statistic
(described in detail below) associated with each comparison.
6. Repeat steps 3-5 several times.
7. For each class of raters (e.g. humanities expert, random, REV, Metric), calculate the mean Γ over all comparisons where the contestant was a member of
that class.
8. Repeat steps 1-7 until a satisfactory set of REV weights has been found (that is,
until incremental improvements to the mean Γ for the REV cannot be made).

4.7

Develop software to implement validation procedure
A software package consisting of several independent modules was developed to

analyze rater responses. Another overarching software application uses these modules
108

to calculate rater statistics and to find optimum weights for the REV (and Metric).
Like the survey software mechanism, this package was coded in PHP, allowing it to
interface naturally with the database tables populated by human raters through the
survey website.
Modular in nature, the validation software is designed to support a variety of
experiments. It primarily supports the validation experiment—comparing and calibrating the REV (and Metric) to expert assessments. The software is also capable of
performing experiments that involve, for example, suboptimal model input parameters, comparisons to other sets of raters, or evaluation of individual raters.

4.7.1

Initialize experiment
Figure 4.2 shows the process flow of the experiment initialization module. This

module provides a starting point for any experiment using rater data—for example,
to compare raters to one another, to evaluate entire classes, to extract demographics
and other interesting statistical information, or to calibrate a model based upon the
data.
The module creates a copy of the rater response table, which contains human
rater data collected via the online survey mechanism, then adds computerized raters
to the new table. These computerized raters include random raters, the REV, and
the Metric. Random raters are generated by the module, recorded with class name
“random” and with responses to scenario decisions randomly chosen as integers from
−2 to +2. The module then takes several sets of REV and Metric inputs, generating
a variant of either the Metric or REV associated with each set (see Section 4.8 for
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Set(s) of
REV and
Metric
inputs

Rater
response
table

START

Calculate
responses for
various
instantiations of
random, REV,
and Metric raters

END

Experiment
rater
response
table

Figure 4.2: The software module that initializes an experiment, setting up a rater
response table for use in an experiment that uses rater data

more information on model variants). Each model variant is given its own class name,
as each variant is compared independently.
This module ensures that the same set of raters–including, most importantly,
the same set of random raters—are used throughout an entire experiment. Complete
source code for this module can be found in Section C.1.

4.7.2

Run experiment
A second module performs a single run of the primary experiment. This pro-

duces an individual statistical analysis for each of a particular set of raters, which

110

Experiment
rater response
table

START

Partition raters
into sets
(K, T , C)

Compare each
contestant in C to
every standard in
T

Calculate  for
each contestant

END

Rater ID, class,
and  for each
comparison
made this run

Figure 4.3: The experiment run module, which calculates comparison statistics for
a set of raters

111

effectively determines how each performs with respect to a set of experts (or some
other subset of raters). It assumes that an experiment has been set up via initialization module (or through another means) and uses the rater data in the experiment
rater response table. Complete source code for this module can be found in Section C.2.
This evaluation of raters involves two steps: partitioning the set of raters into
a set of contestants (those to be evaluated) and a set of standards (those for the
contestants to be evaluated against), then calculating the appropriate statistic for
each contestant. Figure 4.3 shows the process flow behind this comparison process.

4.7.2.1

Partitioning raters into sets

Figure 4.4 shows how the analysis package partitions and recombines raters
to form two sets of interest—a set to evaluate and a set to evaluate against. The set
of all raters R is partitioned into a comparison set K and a set (R r K) containing
all other raters. The comparison set K is then further randomly partitioned into a
standards set T and non-standards set (K r T ). The non-testing set and “other” set
are combined into a set of contestants C = (K r T ) ∪ (R r K). These contestant
raters are then each evaluated in terms of agreement with the standards set T .
The primary experiment undertaken in this research involves comparing all
raters (e.g. humanities experts, military experts, non-experts, the REV, the Metric,
and random raters) to the set of all experts. For this experiment, the comparison set
is the set of all experts, which is randomly subdivided into a set of standards and a
set of “non-standards.” The latter subset is in turn combined with the other raters
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Raters
R

Other raters
R \K

Comparison set
K

(e.g. non-experts,

(e.g. experts)

random, and models)

Non-standards
set
K \T

Standards
T

Compare

Contestants
C

Figure 4.4: Breakdown of raters into various sets. Ultimately, “contestants” are
each evaluated with respect to agreement with the “standards.”
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Table 4.4: All possible partitions of a small set of raters (X1 ...X4 , N1 ...N4 , rREV )
into standards T and contestants C for the primary experiment

T

C

1
X1
X2
X3
X4
N1
N2
N3
N4
rREV

2
X1
X3
X2
X4
N1
N2
N3
N4
rREV

Partitions
3
4
X1
X2
X4
X3
X2
X1
X3
X4
N1
N1
N2
N2
N3
N3
N4
N4
rREV rREV

5
X2
X4
X1
X3
N1
N2
N3
N4
rREV

6
X3
X4
X1
X2
N1
N2
N3
N4
rREV

to form the set of contestants. Thus, some experts are also compared with some of
the other experts alongside all of the other raters.
Table 4.4 explains this process by showing all possible partitionings of a small
set of example raters—four experts X1 ...X4 , four non-experts N1 ...N4 , and the REV—
into a set of standards T and contestants C for a simple version of the primary
experiment. Half of the experts would be used as standards, while half would be
set aside as contestants alongside the other raters. No other raters would appear as
standards, as they are not used as a basis of comparison.
In this specific example, with four experts, there are

 
4
=6
2
ways to partition the experts.
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Although most of this discussion has pertained to the primary experiment, the
module’s process can be generalized to perform other experiments. For example, the
module could use the set of non-experts as the comparison set, assessing how raters
agree with laypersons—all of the above would still hold for the comparison set used.
In general, for nK members of a comparison set, there are



nK
nK /2



ways to partition the set into standards and non-standards.

4.7.2.2

Comparing raters and calculating Γ

Having partitioned raters into contestants and standards, the module then uses
Goodman and Kruskal’s Γ statistic to compare each contestant with every standard.
[1] describes the statistic as
Γ=

c−d
c+d

where c is the number of concordant pairs and d is the number of discordant pairs—
that is, respectively, the number of pairs that rate equivalently and the number of
pairs that do not.11
Following is the pseudocode capturing the above, implemented by this module
to calculate the Γ statistic for each contestant in C:
for each contestant Ci in C do
11

In [1], ties were not counted in the statistic. In this study, ties do not arise in these contestantto-standard comparisons since raters either agree or disagree with one another.

115

c ← 0 (c is the number of concordant pairs for this contestant)
d ← 0 (d is the number of discordant pairs for this contestant)
for each standard Tj in T do
for each scenario Sl = {Sl |l = 0, ..., nS } do
if LCi ,l is concordant with LTj ,l then
c++
else
d++
end if
end for
end for
ΓCi = (c − d)/(c + d)
end for
Note that the “is concordant with” operator works with the Likert scale response provided by raters. The general operator is a placeholder for one of many
different comparisons—a few examples include “has the same sign as,” “is equal to,”
and “has a numerical distance less than or equal to 2 from.” For this study, the first
of these examples was chosen. A response a is concordant with another response b if
sgn(a) = sgn(b); that is, if they share the same numerical sign or are both 0. Thus,
concordance between two raters indicates that the raters both share the same COA
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preference (either for A, for B, or for neither), and does not account for the strength
of that preference.12

4.7.3

Analyze classes using overarching application
In the primary experiment, some experts are randomly set aside as standards,

while the rest are evaluated as contestants along with other non-experts. This has
a few effects on how the results of a single run should be interpreted. First, not all
raters would be evaluated in a single execution of this module—those that are used
as standards would themselves be evaluated with respect to agreement with experts.
Second, experts set aside in this single execution as contestants are not used as a basis
of comparison; thus, effectively, their assessments are not considered to be those of
experts. Third, since the partition of experts into standards and non-standards is
random, a given contestant’s associated Γ value would differ for each run, being
dependent upon which experts are selected for the set of standards. Therefore, for
most practical purposes, an aggregate of several executions of this module produces
more meaningful results, as it provides appropriate representation of each expert in
the testing set and in the comparison set.
The overarching software application performs the task of executing and analyzing multiple runs. This application harnesses the aforementioned software modules,
12

Moreover, due to the nature of this comparison, if a particular rater prefers neither A or B
in a given scenario, it may be less likely for that rater’s assessment to agree with another rater’s
assessment of the same scenario. This is certainly true for two random raters. A random rater
has half the chance of choosing “neither action” than choosing either COA A or COA B. With
five possible responses on the Likert scale, and with a uniform chance of selecting each response, a
random rater has a 20% chance of selecting a particular response. Since two of the possible responses
represent a preference for COA A (-1 and -2) and two for COA B (+1 and +2), there is a 40% chance
that a random rater will prefer COA A and a 40% chance it will prefer COA B. There is only a 20%
chance that the random rater will select the remaining option (0)—that neither action is preferable.
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Set(s) of REV
and Metric
inputs

START

Call initialization
routine

Rater response
table

Initialize experiment

Experiment
rater response
table

Perform a single
run

Run

Iterate several times

Rater ID, class,
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across
comparisons

END

 and  for 
for each rater
class

Figure 4.5: Process flow for overall rater class analysis
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appropriately providing inputs and extracting outputs from each in order to analyze
classes of raters for an experiment. Figure 4.5 shows the process flow behind this
application. Complete source code for this application can be found in Section C.3.
At its core, the application harnesses the Monte Carlo method around the
module performing the single run. The application first initializes a comparison experiment, providing one particular set of raters to use throughout the experiment.
Then, it executes the single run module several times, producing rater comparisons
using a set of contestants using a randomly-chosen set of standards drawn out of the
comparison set. It collects every comparison—an ID for the contestant compared,
its associated Γ value, and its class—that the module provides. After completing its
runs, the application calculates and outputs the mean Γ and standard deviation for Γ
for each class, including every variant of the REV and Metric, across all comparisons.
The example presented in Section 4.7.2.1 uses four experts, four non-experts,
and the REV. If this application performs the single run a certain number of times, the
classes of non-experts, experts, and REV each have a certain number of comparisons—
each with a single Γ value associated with it—dependent upon the number of runs
made and the number of members of the class. If the application performs the run
three times, the REV is compared to the entire testing set three times and, therefore, has three total comparisons. Each member of the class of non-experts likewise
has three comparisons; however, the entire class of non-experts, consisting of four
members, has 4 × 3 = 12 total comparisons. For the class of experts, only half of
the experts—two of the four—are used as contestants in each run, and, therefore, the
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expert class has has 4 × 2 = 8 total runs associated with it.13 The Γ values associated
with the runs for each class are then used to analyze and compare the classes as a
whole.

4.7.4

On an elaborated validation procedure
The following pseudocode is an elaboration of the validation procedure out-

lined in Section 4.6:
w1 ...w4 ← (initialize REV weights)
while Γ̄ for REV can feasibly be further increased do
X ← expert raters from rater table
N ← non-expert raters from rater table
U ← {generated random raters U1 ...U1,000 }
Generate rMetric (Metric rater)
Calculate or retrieve candidate REV weights t1 ...t4 for this run
Generate models rREV (REV rater) using these weights
R ← {X, N, U, {rREV , rMetric }}
loop several times
K ← {} (initialize comparison set K as empty)
T ← {} (initialize standards set T as empty)
13
While every rather that is not in the class of experts are compared in each run, some experts—
those set aside as standards—are not compared in some runs. If the three runs chosen resulted in
expert partitions 2, 4, and 5 in Table 4.4 then X2 and X4 had comparisons in the first run, X1 and
X4 in the second, and X1 and X3 in the third. Therefore, over the three runs, X1 and X4 would
each have two comparisons, while X2 and X3 would each have one. This is especially important to
note when evaluating single raters in a comparison set, it becomes less important when evaluating
entire classes of raters.
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C ← {} (initialize contestants set C as empty)
C ← {} (contestants set C—non-experts, models, and random raters)
T ← {random half of X} (set some random experts aside as testers)
C ← {X r T } (place remaining experts with other contestants)
for each contestant Ci in C do
Calculate Γ statistic for contestant, generating a comparison for that
contestant’s class
end for
end loop
for each rater class k (e.g. REV, military experts, non-experts, ...) do
Calculate Γ̄ over all comparisons made for members of class k
end for
if Γ̄ for REV using t1 ...t4 > Γ̄ for REV using w1 ...w4 then
w1 ...w4 ← t1 ...t4
end if
end while
return w1 ...w4
Ultimately, the application described above implements the code inside the
while loop in the pseudocode. For the primary experiment, the “backbone” is trivially implemented in software, which itself calls the application several times until
optimum weights for the REV are found.
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4.7.5

On using the Monte Carlo method to draw comparisons
Section 4.7.2.1 indicates that there are a finite number of possible partitions of

the comparison set into standards and non-standards and, therefore, a finite number of
comparisons (especially Table 4.4 explicitly enumerates six partitions for a particular
set of raters). This would suggest that exhausting every possible partition is more
prudent than randomly selecting partitions. However, for an experiment with an
adequate number of members in the comparison set, this is impractical.
A specific case illustrates this point. For a set of 180 total raters, a single run
executes rather quickly—in 0.165 seconds.14 A 40-member comparison set requires,
however,


nK
nK /2



 
40
=
= 1.378 × 1011
20

runs. In total, these runs would take 2.227×1010 seconds, or around 721 years, to fully
execute. Therefore, a Monte Carlo analysis with a suffiecient but computationally
feasible number of runs is deemed sufficient to sample the space of possible partitions
of a comparison set (or, for the primary experiment, of the set of experts).

4.8

Identify relevant model variants to analyze
As detailed in Section 1.2.3, a few variants of Metric v0 and of Metric v1 were

analyzed in the Metric research to provide a more complete picture.
14

This execution time was recorded on a desktop computer with 2048 MB RAM and an
Intel R CoreTM 2 Quad CPU Q9550 microprocessor.
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The primary goal of this research is to calibrate both the Metric and the
REV—to find the best possible parameter values for each—then to compare these
calibrated versions with one another and with experts. However, other, non-optimal
variations of the models can represent different perspectives on ethical harm. For
example, the optimally calibrated REV can be compared to a variant where civilian
non-maleficence dominates all other factors in order to further retest the notion that
intentional harm to civilians is the only significant factor used in experts’ ethical
assessments. Thus, just as in the Metric research, some variants of each model are
also tested. Following is a description the model variations and the motivation behind
their inclusion.

4.8.1

REV, calibrated
The “calibrated” variant of the REV is intended to match experts as closely

as possible. Determining this variant’s weights involved several iterations of the overarching analysis application (described in Section 4.7.3).
First, several instances of the REV class, with all possible combinations of
principle weights with multiples of 0.25, were all analyzed using the overarching application. Each was to run 300 times to produce an average Γ value. The most
promising combinations, those that yielded high Γ values, were used as starting points
for further analysis.15 Table 4.5 lists these promising combinations.
15

It is worth noting that all of these promising combinations have a high w1 , low w4 , and middling
w2 and w3 .
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Table 4.5: REV weight combinations determined to be the best starting points for
REV calibration
w1
0.75
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

w2
0.50
0.50
0.75
0.75
0.75

w3
0.25
0.25
0.00
0.50
0.50

w4
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.25

Γ̄
-0.0666
-0.0673
-0.8930
-0.0617
-0.0638

Further incremental improvements yielded the following weights for this variant of the REV:

REV, calibrated: w1 = 1.00, w2 = 0.65, w3 = 0.25, w4 = 0.00

Although w4 is identified as an important principle in Section 4.2, its calibrated
weight is 0. This is largely an artifact of the model design and the calibration process
rather than of the principles chosen. The REV’s weights can be considered a measure
of the relative importance of the principles provided to it—when calibrated, p1 is
deemed much more important than p4 . The numerical difference between these two
weights, however, may be less if principles that are deemed even less important than
p4 are incorporated into the model.16

4.8.2

REV, all weights equal
The “all weights equal” variant of the REV considers all principles under

analysis to be of equal weight—that is, where w1 = w2 = w3 = w4 = c, where c is
16

Future work described in Section 6.2.1 could provide a test of this.
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some constant and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. This represents a test of the standpoint presented in
Section 2.2.3:
[...] [C]apturing how human raters prioritize or trade between ethical
principles is a novel and significant approach, as many tools (such as
McLaren’s SIROCCO [40] [...]) and discussions of principles (such as
Ross’s prima facie duties [64]) tend to assume that all principles are
weighted equally.
Thus, the REV was explicitly designed with the idea of principle tradeoffs in
mind. As a result, when all weights are equal to some c, the REV’s expression for
the ∆V for any scenario reduces to 0:

∆VAj Bj = wpAj − wpBj = c − c = 0

This variant would regard any pair of COAs to be equally ethically preferable.
Any given c would produce an equivalent Γ value, aside from the inherent randomness
of the analysis procedure. For this experiment, c is chosen to be 1:

REV, all weights equal: w1 = 1, w2 = 1, w3 = 1, w4 = 1

4.8.3

REV, dominant p1
In this variant, p1 (which involves avoiding harm to civilians) dominates over

all other principles, just as the presence of intentional civilian casualties dominated
other consequences in the Metric. This variant is included to further test the idea
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Table 4.6: Parameter values for the recalibrated Metric used in this experiment
Category
Enemy

Friendly

Parameter
Civilian casualties
Utilities destroyed
Cultural facilities destroyed
Military casualties
Civilian casualties
Utilities destroyed
Cultural facilities destroyed
Military casualties

Value
0.24379
0.02168
0.13382
0.04792
0.27014
0.41354
0.13368
0.08759

Parameter
Global factors

Evil power factor
Low confidence std. score
High confidence std. score
Diminishing factor

0.69811
0.0
1.0
0.54717

that intentional harm to civilians or bystanders is the overwhelming factor used in
ethical assessment, which the Metric research found to be the case. If this variant
produced a high Γ value, it would corroborate that finding.
The notion of p1 “dominating” over all other principles can take a general
formulation of w1  w2 , w2 ≈ w3 ≈ w4 . This experiment uses the following weights
for this variant:

REV, dominant p1 : w1 = 1, w2 = 0, w3 = 0, w4 = 0

4.8.4

Metric, recalibrated
The single variant of the Metric used in this experiment represents the best

possible calibration of the Metric for this set of scenarios—that is, the Metric as
recalibrated for this experiment. The Metric uses 12 consequences and global param126

eters in total, and its design involves a set of complex formulas. The Monte Carlo
method was used to sift through the parameter space and to determine the parameter
values that yielded the highest-performing Metric. Table 4.6 shows the recalibrated
parameter values.
In addition to these parameters, the Metric calculations use other, more indirect variables, such as the actor’s intent and the decision-maker’s level of confidence.
These were set using heuristics rather than calibration. As mentioned, the intent of
each consequence behind a COA is encoded as 1.0 if the consequence is a goal of the
COA, 0.5 if it is consequential but still a direct result of the action, and 0.25 if it is
the result of a potential retaliation by the opposing force. Moreover, the user’s confidence ci behind any given input value i was set to 0.8. Additionally, the difference
between an input i’s high and low values, hi and li , was assumed to be 20%—for some
consequence with a determined “base value” of k, hi = 1.1 × k and li = 0.9 × k.

4.9

Develop and test research hypotheses
In the Metric research, the rankings of Metric v0 and v1 were compared to

single point estimates—the average ranking of each class of raters (e.g. random raters
and military experts) and the ranking of other versions of the model. This research
uses a more careful statistical formulation.
Classes of raters can be compared by a comparison of their two means of associated Γ values. Ultimately, classes are be compared with respect to their agreement
with a comparison set. In the primary experiment, this comparison set is the set of
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experts. The hypothesis test for the primary experiment, for two classes C1 and C2 ,
becomes the following:
• H0 : Agreement of class C1 with the set of experts = agreement of class C2 with
the set of experts
• H1 : Agreement of class C1 with the set of experts > agreement of class C2 with
the set of experts
If the number of comparisons associated with a class is adequately large, the
test statistic Z can be used for class-to-class comparisons:

Γ̄C − Γ̄C2
Z=r 1
2
2
σC
σC
1
2
+
nC
nC
1

2

This Z statistic is then converted to a p-value, which represents the probability
that the given data would be observed if H0 is true. This p-value is then compared
to a predetermined α value—if it is smaller than α, then H0 is rejected. For this
experiment, α is chosen to be 0.05.
Thus, if the p-value associated with the comparison between classes C1 and
C2 is less than 0.05, then H0 for this comparison is rejected, and it is concluded that
C1 statistically significantly outperforms C2 . Otherwise, H0 fails to be rejected.
In comparing classes of raters, this method determines whether one class outperforms one another; thus, the statistical equivalence testing method discussed in
the literature survey in Section 2.4.3.2, which provides a rigorous test of whether two
models are equivalent, is not necessary for class comparisons.
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CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Mankind is not a circle with a single center, but an ellipse with two focal points—of
which facts are one and ideas the other.
—Victor Hugo
This chapter presents the overall results from the validation process, comparing
the calibrated REV and Metric, their variants, and other classes of raters.

5.1

Models’ scenario assessments
Human raters’ assessments for each scenario were encoded and recorded as

integers ranging from -2 to +2 (-2, -1, 0, +1, +2), which, in turn, range from a strong
preference for COA A to a strong preference for COA B. In contrast, the REV and
Metric do not report a strength of preference to the end user; their ∆V and the ∆G
values, measures of this strength, are only used internally. However, to facilitate a
uniform comparison of all raters that is independent from the method of comparison,
the models’ assessments were translated to entries on the Likert scale.1
1

Ultimately, the specific concordance operator chosen to assess the concordance between two
responses does not depend upon raters’ strength of preference (see Section 4.7.2.2)—two responses
are said to be in agreement if they are both positive, negative, or zero.
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Table 5.1: Resultant COA choices for each scenario (1-6), for each variant of REV
and Metric

Variant

Scenario
3
4

1

2

5

6

(p1 & p2 )

(p1 & p3 )

(p1 & p4 )

(p2 & p3 )

(p2 & p4 )

(p3 & p4 )

1
2
0
-1

2
2
0
1

2
2
0
1

1
0
0
1

1
0
0
2

1
0
0
0

REV, calibrated
REV, dominant p1
REV, all weights equal
Metric, recalibrated

Because the REV’s structure is simple, so too is the process of translating its
assessments. The REV’s ∆V assessment for a given scenario j can be translated to
a Likert entry as follows:

LREV,j = round(2∆Vj ) = round(2 × (wpAj − wpBj ))

The Metric’s conversion is more difficult, as its ∆G values can take on a wide
range. For a given variant of the Metric, the magnitudes of its ∆G values for all
scenarios were used to calculate each of its Likert response values. If, for a given
scenario, the magnitude of its calculated ∆G value is below the 10th percentile for
all values, its associated Likert considered to be 0. If it is between the 10th and
50th percentiles, the magnitude of the Likert response is 1. If it is above the 50th
percentile, the magnitude is 2.
Table 5.1 shows how each variant of the REV and the Metric responds to each
scenario.
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Table 5.2: Results from this research, presenting mean Γ, number of raters, and
other relevant information for each class. All non-human rater classes are bolded.
Refer to Section 5.2 for an explanation of this table and of the p-value column.

Class
REV, calibrated
Metric, recalibrated
Military experts
All experts
All people
Non-experts
Humanities experts
Random
REV, dominant p1
REV, all weights equal

5.2

# raters

# comparisons

Γ̄

σΓ

1
1
51
86
141
55
35
1,000
1
1

1,000
1,000
25,525
41,000
98,000
55,000
17,475
1,000,000
1,000
1,000

-0.0650
-0.2442
-0.2455
-0.2515
-0.2557
-0.2589
-0.2603
-0.2727
-0.3783
-0.6438

0.0515
0.0381
0.1012
0.1253
0.1332
0.1390
0.1534
0.1035
0.0409
0.0485

p-value of Γ̄
comparison
with below
< 0.001
0.1790
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.1426
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
—

REV, Metric, and other class comparisons
Table 5.2 shows the results of 1,000 runs of the previously outlined procedure

per class in tabular format, and the confidence interval plot of Figure 5.1 provides
a sense of the distance between the mean Γ values for each class. The human rater
classes, model variants, and random rater class (with 1,000 participants) are all included. The rightmost column of the table presents the p-value for the class’s comparison with the class below it, with most class comparisons being highly statistically
significant.
Most importantly, the results show that the calibrated REV outperforms all
other class of raters—including expert raters. In addition, the recalibrated Metric
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REV, calibrated

Metric, recalibrated
Military experts
All experts
All people
Non-experts

Humanities experts
Random

REV, dominant p 1
REV, all weights equal

-1.0

-0.9

-0.8

-0.7

-0.6

-0.5

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

Figure 5.1: Confidence interval plot for Γ per rater class, where error bars represent
one standard deviation from the mean

rests at a distant second place in the class rankings, while other variants of the REV
were outperformed by random raters.
The entire comparison space is also explored in depth and presented in Table 5.3. For each cell in this table, the class in its corresponding row is compared to
the class in its corresponding cell to produce the p-value for the comparison. Self-
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Table 5.3: p-values for all class-to-class comparisons. This table is split horizontally.
Most p-values indicated were several orders of magnitude less than α.

REV, calibrated
Military experts
Metric, recalibrated
All experts
All people
Non-experts
Humanities experts
Random raters
REV, dominant p1
REV, calibrated
Military experts
Metric, recalibrated
All experts
All people
Non-experts
Humanities experts
Random raters
REV, dominant p1

REV
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Non-experts
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
—
—
—
—

Military
< 0.001
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Humanities
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.1426
—
—
—

Metric
< 0.001
0.1790
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Random
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
—
—

All experts
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
—
—
—
—
—
—
REV, p1
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
—

All people
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
—
—
—
—
—
REV, weights equal
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

comparisons, such as random-to-random, are omitted. The entry associated with the
lowest-performing class is also removed.
In short, the table demonstrates that almost every class of rater statistically
significantly agrees with experts more so than every class that had a lower Γ̄ value
than it as per Table 5.2. That is, the calibrated REV significantly agrees more with
the set of all experts than all other classes, the humanities experts than all of the
models listed below it, and the “intact” Metric than the REV variant with equal
weights.

133

The sole exceptions to this are the comparison between military experts and
the recalibrated Metric, and the comparison between non-experts and humanities.
Both of these comparisons are not statistically significant.
Appendix D shows the mean Γ value for each human and model (non-random)
rater used in the experiment.

5.3

Human rater demographics, information, and comments
The data collected in the survey process provided the following additional

information:
• 18% of raters who provided any demographic information specified that they
have had combat experience.
• Across all scenario responses provided by all class members, 14% of military
expert responses, 22% of humanities expert responses, and 20% of non-expert
responses were that neither action was ethically preferable.
• The average time for raters to complete the “Scenarios and decisions” survey
page was 17 minutes, 34 seconds.
• 78% respondents provided at least some optional demographic information.
• The average age for respondents who shared their age was approximately 47
years.
• Of those who provided their rough area of residence, 93% lived in the United
States and 7% lived in other countries.
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• Responses indicated that valuation of any given principle did not correlate with
age.
• 29% of these respondents reported that they had bachelor’s degrees, and 35%
reported that they had masters degrees. Additionally, 18% specified that they
had doctoral degrees—these were roughly evenly split between humanities experts, military experts, and non-experts.
• Comparisons using age, location, and other demographics were not large enough
to determine whether these have an effect on concordance.
Some participants chose to leave additional free-form comments about their
thought processes and about the research. The common thread in most comments was
difficulty in making assessments—primarily, in trading off between the perspectives
offered by various aspects of their background. One rater, presumably with training
in military and in the humanities, discussed how he/she went “back and forth through
each discipline” but ultimately knew that he/she “could not take a total pacific view.”
Another stated that he/she deliberated over what to do if “something is ethically less
preferable but logically better for the war effort.”
Figure 5.2 shows the cumulative number of responses to the questionnaire from
human raters over time, shown in number of days since the questionnaire was opened
to the public. Various rounds of solicitations were made into different pools at several
times during the time window in which the questionnaire was open.
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Responses

150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

0

7

14

21

28

35

42

Days open
Figure 5.2: Cumulative number of human rater responses over time (days)

5.4

Summary
Results of this experiment can be summarized as follows:
• The REV, with properly calibrated weights for its principles, outperforms every
class of raters—including the Metric, non-expert raters, and even expert raters.
• The Metric variant recalibrated for this experiment did not fare well when
compared to the REV—or, in general, to human raters of any kind.
• Humanities experts disagreed with the set of all experts much more than did
military experts. As mentioned above, a large number of humanities experts’
responses indicated a preference for neither action in a given scenario. Moreover,
as explained in Section 4.7.2.2, it may be less likely for a lack of preference for
once COA over another to agree with another rater’s preference. Humanities
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experts were also less represented than military experts in the overall set of
experts.
• As such, the agreement statistic for class of all expert raters dropped slightly
below that of the class of military experts, since it included humanities experts
as well.
• Both non-optimal variants of the REV—that where civilian non-maleficence
was allowed to dominate and that where every principle was weighted equally—
performed worse than random.
• Non-experts and humanities experts were not statistically different with respect
to their agreement with the set of all raters.
• The raters’ free-form comments reinforced the idea that they evaluate ethical
scenarios by making ethical tradeoffs.

5.5

Responses to research questions
The research questions posed in Section 1.5 can be answered as follows:

1. Can a quantitative model adequately capture the ethical tradeoffs made by military experts and humanities experts?
As evidenced by the strong performance of the REV, a quantitative model can
adequately capture the ethical tradeoffs made by military experts and humanities experts.
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2. Does a model based upon ethical principles perform better than one based upon
tangible consequences?
Comparing the performance of the calibrated REV to that of the Metric suggests
that a model based upon ethical principles does perform better than one based
upon tangible consequences.
3. Do principles other than civilian harm factor into expert assessment?
The performance of the calibrated REV compared to the p1 -dominant REV suggests that principles other than civilian harm do factor into expert assessment.
4. Do military experts, humanities experts, and non-experts make ethical tradeoffs
differently?
Differing class-wide values of Γ̄, which measure comparison of rater classes to
the set of all experts, suggests that some classes of human raters may make
ethical tradeoffs differently than others.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Just as the ability to devise simple but
evocative models is the signature of the
great scientist so overelaboration and overparameterization is often the mark of mediocrity.
—George E. P. Box
Overall, this research saw the successful development of a model that provides
a principle-based perspective on the ethics behind military decision-making. The
model, while powerful, is also very simple in structure—a linear, weighted sum of
inputs. The complexity behind this model is in the meaningful development of the
simuland—which primarily involved determining what exactly the simuland is—and
how it should be decomposed into a set of inputs.
This section discusses the findings of this research and potential future extensions of this work. Just as this research was influenced by the “future work” of the
Metric research, so too could the REV’s “future work” inspire improvements in the
realm of ethical decision-making.
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6.1

Findings of this research
The primary finding of this research is that a quantitative model is able to

capture ethical tradeoffs made by military and humanities experts. This finding is
similar to and congruent with the primary finding of the Metric research—that the
overall concept is viable and practical.
Other findings of this research contrast with those of the previous Metric
research. Most importantly, this research indicates that harm to civilians is not an
overwhelmingly dominant factor in realistic military scenarios, which are laden with
context and present decisions between two potentially contentious actions.
Moreover, the Metric’s optimum parameter values, found through a Monte
Carlo analysis of its 12 parameters (refer to Table 4.6), do not seem to carry an
intuitive meaning as they did in the original Metric research. While civilian casualties
do weigh somewhat heavily on its decisions, the recalibrated Metric lists “friendly
utilities destroyed” as the highest contributing factor behind an action’s ethical harm.
Moreover, its calibrated “evil power factor” is less than 1, indicating that the Metric
believes the magnitude of a consequence to be somewhat more important than its
intent. The interpretation of the REV’s weightings is much more straightforward.
In addition, human raters expressed much less consensus in this experiment
than in the original Metric research. However, this is an artifact of the nature of the
dilemmas that the raters faced. In the end, the sheer difficulty in evaluating these
dilemmas was what extracted clear tendencies on how raters make ethical tradeoffs
when a dilemma presses them—when “push comes to shove.”
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Despite the apparent lack of consensus on the part of human raters, the research drew patterns from their assessments. Analysis of these patterns suggested
trends behind how they weighed principles in their minds as they assessed the ethical
dilemmas presented to them. For these raters, while civilian non-maleficence is an important factor, military necessity and maintaining proportional harm also contributed
to various degrees to raters’ assessments. The REV’s calibrated weights represent an
encoding of these patterns.
The REV itself is limited to simulating the behavior of human raters (by
way of making similar assessments); however, rater comments provided insight into
the raters’ actual thought processes. Many raters explicitly stated that they make
decisions by evaluating principles or making other difficult tradeoffs—regardless of
their expertise. A “humanitarian” perspective is not limited to humanities experts,
nor are military experts the only people to incorporate military goals in their thinking.
This difficulty is natural and is not a detriment to this research; viewing
difficult situations from multiple perspectives provides a more holistic picture. This
ultimately leads hypothetical decision-makers to assess a situation using the whole
of their background and knowledge, then to make a choice—which itself hints at the
ethical tradeoffs they make. One rater stated that he/she “struggled with balancing
ethics with experiences/opinions”—which itself, according to the rater, caused “a
general central tendency” in the answers provided. Rater comments reinforce the
idea that they make tradeoffs between “morals, values, ethics, and principles,” allowed
“values [to] dictate [their] response[s],” and vying for actions that would promote “a
just war.”
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6.2

Future work
The concept that underlies the Metric and the REV is clearly viable. The

original Metric thought experiment was enhanced through further research, and that
further research guided the research for the REV. This trajectory toward a better
understanding of ethical decision modeling can and should be made—whether by
refining the REV itself or by using that underlying concept to develop another ethical
decision support model. This section offers a few suggestions.

6.2.1

Expand COAs, scenarios, and domain of application
One rater comment indicated that he/she could “often” identify “much better

options available” than those presented. An enhanced set of scenarios, perhaps with
more than two potential COAs—or even with COAs that could be structured from the
ground up by the rater—could provide a deeper exploration of the ethical trade space.
Interviews with subject matter experts or veterans could help identify additional
viable COAs.
In addition, the ethical trade space could itself be expanded. The set of principles used in this research was chosen from those referenced most in a few key sources.
Further research could incorporate more principles that are relevant to military decision analysis but were not used in this experiment.
The REV could be tested in a different domain, using a principle set and scenarios appropriate for that domain. Some audiences have specifically suggested that
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the concept could be useful for law and medicine—two fields that, like the military,
face pressing ethical concerns with significant effects.

6.2.2

Test situation dependence of principles
Moreover, the approach undertaken by the model necessarily assumes that

the weighting, or importance, of each principle is independent of the situation at
hand. However, from a philosophical standpoint, this assumption may be doubted—
for example, self-defense may be more important than justice in one situation but
not in another. The author invites expansions of this research to further test this
assumption via an independent survey. An appropriate venue for this may be, for
example, a masters-level independent study project.

6.2.3

Connect tangible consequences and principles
The Metric research harnesses tangible consequences, and the REV incorpo-

rates ethical principles. This suggests that, in a tangential line of research, a connection could be made between consequences and principles.
In addition to comparing violations of principles to ethical harm, and comparing tangible consequences to ethical harm, future research could compare tangible
consequences to violations of principles—that is, to additionally determine whether
violations of principles can be expressed in terms of tangible consequences. This
would provide a more general comparison between ways to frame ethical harm.
Comparisons could perhaps be framed as a set of k × j equations (one for each
combination of principle and action):
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akj =

X
i

lki + hki
ωji ×
2



That is, the degree to which each action k adheres to each principle j can be
expressed in terms of a weighted sum of the magnitude of each consequence i with
weightings ω. These constants can be adjusted such that the system of equations
stands. This will produce, for each action k, how the combination of its tangible
consequences contributes to its adherence to each principle j.
The actions may be able to be combined to produce a scenario-invariant comparison of each principle j with a weighted set of tangible consequences. This will
involve another equation for each principle j:

Aj =

na
X
k=0

Ωk akj =

na
X
k=0

"

Ωk ×

X
i

lki + hki
ωji ×
2

#

Here, Ωk represents the weight assigned to each action k for this calculation. If
a set of Ω and ω values can be found through this may indicate meaningful, situationinvariant comparisons between principles and consequences.
Future work could refine and expand this formulation.
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APPENDIX A

SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS

A.1

Scenario 1: Intercontinental warfare
p1 Civilian non-maleficence vs. p2 Military necessity
Scenario as provided to rater
Intercontinental warfare
Situation
You are a military decision-maker for the nation of Blue, engaged in conflict against
Red.
Blue and Red are nations on opposing sides of a massive war between two coalitions
with conflicting ideologies. This large-scale conflict between the continents has continued for four years, with heavy combatant and civilian losses on both sides. Blue is
currently using its submarine fleet to blockade Red, which is an island nation. Blue’s
blockade has become increasingly effective, and now cut off from fuel and war materials, Red is effectively unable to conduct offensive military operations. However, a side
effect of the blockade is that some food supplies are also cut off, resulting in pervasive
malnutrition among the Red civilian population; consequently, approximately 5,000
Red civilians are starving to death each month. Despite this, the Red leadership has
asserted their unwillingness to consider surrender.
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Blue has just secretly conducted a successful test of a new weapon of mass destruction.
It will be ready for operational use in four months. If it is used it will certainly end
the war in a matter of days. However, using the weapon will unavoidably result in
massive Red civilian casualties, estimated to be approximately 100,000, as well as the
complete destruction of a very large Red city, including 100 essential utility facilities
and 40 irreplaceable cultural and religious sites.
The Blue leadership is reluctantly going to proceed to use the weapon of mass destruction when it is ready. Given the imminent availability of the new weapon, continuing
the submarine blockade of Red is not strictly necessary to win the war. You must
decide whether or not to continue the blockade until the new weapon is ready for use.
Courses of action
Discontinue the blockade and definitely use the new weapon
Discontinuing the blockade means that the starvation deaths among the Red civilian population will end. However, there is a chance (approximately 25%) that Red
will launch a last-ditch offensive costing an estimated 40,000 combined Red and Blue
combatant casualties—20,000 for each nation. Moreover, Red will certainly not surrender, thereby ensuring that to end the war Blue will have to use the weapon of mass
destruction, causing the death of a great many Red civilians.
Continue the blockade and probably use the new weapon
Continuing the blockade means that Red will be unable to launch any potentially costly
offensives, and there is a small chance (approximately 10%) that the Red leadership
will have a change of heart and surrender, eliminating the need to use the weapon of
mass destruction. However, Red civilians will go on suffering and starving due to the
blockade.
Decision

147

Given only the information above, is discontinuing the blockade or continuing the
blockade ethically preferable?
• Discontinuing the blockade is clearly ethically preferable.
• Discontinuing the blockade is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Neither action is ethically preferable over the other.
• Continuing the blockade is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Continuing the blockade is clearly ethically preferable.

Historical inspiration: World War II, U.S. vs. Japan, 1945
Model inputs
COA A

COA B

Number

Intent

Number

Intent

# Enemy civilian casualties

100,000

0.5

110,000

0.5

# Enemy utilities destroyed

100

0.5

90

0.5

# Enemy cultural sites destroyed

40

0.5

36

0.5

# Enemy combatant casualties

500

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly civilian casualties

0

0.25

0

0.25

# Friendly utilities destroyed

0

0.25

0

0.25

# Friendly cultural sites destroyed

0

0.25

0

0.25

5,000

0.25

0

0.25

# Friendly combatant casualties
Violated principle

p1
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p2

A.2

Scenario 2: The border encroachment
p1 Civilian non-maleficence vs. p3 Proportionality
Scenario as provided to rater
The border encroachment
Situation
You are a military decision-maker for the nation of Blue, engaged in conflict against
Red.
Blue is engaged in an ongoing series of conventional, low-intensity military skirmishes
with Red over a disputed province that lies on their shared border. The province is
currently controlled by Blue, but the civilian population of the province is an intermingled mixture of ethnic and religious groups, some of whom identify with Blue and
others with Red. Throughout the three-year period of these skirmishes, Red and Blue
have each suffered around 2,500 combatant casualties. Both Red and Blue have a small
arsenal of moderate-yield nuclear weapons; so far neither nation has used them in any
conflict, but the resulting threat of nuclear exchange creates great tension between the
two nations, intensifying the stakes behind this border dispute.
Recently a medium-sized force of Red combatants unexpectedly crossed the border
and occupied a village within the disputed province, quickly overwhelming the small
detachment of Blue soldiers manning an observation post nearby. The citizens of the
village, which include both Blue and Red sympathizers, were not allowed to leave
the village and are now essentially prisoners or hostages. During the Red attack and
occupation one Blue historical cultural site and one facility that provided essential
utilities to surrounding civilian population was destroyed.
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The Blue military leadership has identified two courses of action that are certain to
force Red to retreat from the village and reestablish Blue control. You must decide
which course of action to use to recapture the village.
Courses of action
Use a ground assault
A direct ground assault on the village with a large Blue force, will drive the Red
combatants out of the village. However, the fighting within the village will endanger the
village’s population and risk the destruction of facilities and buildings. Because Blue
can achieve quick victory by deploying an overwhelming force, combatant casualties
are expected to be comparatively light. In the operation, Blue will face 25 combatant
casualties, while Red will face around 40 military casualties.
The ground assault is estimated to result in consequential civilian casualties of around
350 Blue citizens and around 350 Red (but not hostile) civilian immigrants to the
village. The operation must also necessarily destroy two Blue cultural sites that have
been seized by Red combatants.
Use an air strike
An air strike against a major Red military base located just over the border would also
force the occupying Red troops to retreat from the contested village because their logistical support comes from that base. However, the Red base has extensive air defenses,
including radar sites, anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles. Consequently, a
successful Blue air strike will require a large strike force and will likely result in many
combatant casualties for the Red defenders. Moreover, the destruction of the important Red base is likely to be seen by Red as an intentional and dangerous escalation
of the conflict.
The air strike is expected to cause 5,000 combatant casualties, mostly Red. It is also
expected to damage or destroy 10 historical landmarks and 5 facilities that provide
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essential utilities to the Red population located near the military base. In anticipation
of this or other potential Blue responses, however, Red has evacuated its civilians from
the area near the base and therefore will not suffer any civilian casualties.
Decision
Given only the information above, is using a ground assault or using an air strike
ethically preferable?
• Using a ground assault is clearly ethically preferable.
• Using a ground assault is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Neither action is ethically preferable over the other.
• Using an air strike is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Using an air strike is clearly ethically preferable.

Historical inspiration: India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir province
Model inputs
COA A

COA B

Number

Intent

Number

Intent

# Enemy civilian casualties

350

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy utilities destroyed

0

0.5

5

0.5

# Enemy cultural sites destroyed

0

0.5

10

0.5

# Enemy combatant casualties

400

0.5

5,000

0.5

# Friendly civilian casualties

350

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly utilities destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly cultural sites destroyed

2

0.5

0

0.5

250

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly combatant casualties
Violated principle

p1
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p3

A.3

Scenario 3: Stabilization
p1 Civilian non-maleficence vs. p4 Prospect of success
Scenario as provided to rater
Stabilization
Situation
You are a military decision-maker for the nation of Blue, engaged in conflict against
Red.
Approximately eight years ago, Blue sent its ground and air forces to the distant and
undeveloped nation of Red to quell an armed insurgency that was threatening regional
stability and providing a safe haven for international terrorists. After initial successes,
Blue has not been able to entirely eliminate the insurgency. Unable to oppose the
superior Blue forces in open combat, the Red insurgents have hidden themselves among
the Red civilian population in the cities, from where they both launch terror attacks
and raids against Blue bases. In order to minimize civilian casualties, Blue has largely
confined its efforts to patrolling the rural areas outside the cities. The conflict has
stalemated and back home the Blue population is losing its patience with the conflict’s
high cost and lack of progress.
The Blue military leadership has identified two courses of action to pursue from here.
You must decide which course of action to pursue.
Courses of action
Launch urban sweep
Blue can launch a massive house-to-house sweep of the Red capital city in order to root
out the insurgents from their hidden bases. This will probably end the Red insurgency,
but a large number of Red civilians are likely to be killed or wounded during the sweep.
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This course of action would end the conflict within 3 months, but over that time it
is expected to cost 4,000 insurgent casualties, 1,500 Blue combatant casualties, and
12,000 Red civilian casualties. About 12 cultural sites and 20 infrastructure facilities
will be destroyed during the sweep.
Continue rural patrols
Blue can opt to maintain the status quo, patrolling the countryside in the hopes of
intercepting and eliminating enough insurgent fighters to break their will to resist.
Based on the conflict’s progress so far, this is unlikely to succeed, but it does avoid
most civilian casualties.
With this course of action, the conflict could continue at least another eight years,
costing about 2,000 insurgent casualties, 500 Blue combatant casualties, and 200 Red
civilian casualties per year. About 2 cultural sites and 4 infrastructure facilities are
likely to be destroyed each year.
Decision
Given only the information above, is continuing rural patrols or launching an urban
sweep ethically preferable?
• Launching an urban sweep is clearly ethically preferable.
• Launching an urban sweep is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Neither action is ethically preferable over the other.
• Continuing rural patrols is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Continuing rural patrols is clearly ethically preferable.

Historical inspiration: U.S. operations in Afghanistan, ongoing
Model inputs
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COA A

COA B

Number

Intent

Number

Intent

# Enemy civilian casualties

8,000

0.5

1,600

0.5

# Enemy utilities destroyed

20

0.5

32

0.5

# Enemy cultural sites destroyed

12

0.5

16

0.5

4,000

1.0

16,000

0.5

# Friendly civilian casualties

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly utilities destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly cultural sites destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

1,500

0.5

4,000

0.5

# Enemy combatant casualties

# Friendly combatant casualties
Violated principle

p1
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p4

A.4

Scenario 4: The archipelago
p2 Military necessity vs. p3 Proportionality
Scenario as provided to rater
The archipelago
Situation
You are a military decision-maker for the nation of Blue, engaged in conflict against
Red.
Blue and Red have disagreed for nearly a century over sovereignty of a small group
of islands. The disagreement is largely a matter of national pride, as the islands have
little economic value. The islands, which are located much nearer to Red than to Blue,
nonetheless had been controlled by Blue for the last 70 years. Fewer than 3,000 Blue
citizens currently live on the islands.
A surprise landing on the island by Red paratroopers resulted in a quick occupation
with very few combatant losses (less than 150) on either side. In response Blue has
sent a naval task force to recapture the islands. To protect its naval forces while they
prepare for the recapture operation, Blue declares an exclusion zone around the islands,
stating that any Red naval vessel entering the zone will be sunk without warning.
Before Blue is ready to land ground forces to recapture the islands, a Blue submarine
patrolling the exclusion zone spots three Red vessels, a military transport ship loaded
with Red ground troops meant to reinforce Red’s defenses on the island and a two
small escorting warships attempting to protect the transport. The Blue submarine is
likely able to sink any one of the Red vessels in its initial attack.
You must decide which Red naval vessel to sink.
Courses of action
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Sink the transport
Sinking the transport will prevent Red from reinforcing its island defenses and will
likely ensure Blue success in the imminent recapture operation. However, sinking the
heavily loaded troopship in the open ocean will result in 3,000-4,000 Red soldiers killed.
Sink one of the escorting warships
Sinking one of the escorts could kill up to 250 Red sailors, but possibly less, because
naval crews are trained to abandon a ship if necessary. However, if one escort is sunk
the second escort is likely to force the submarine to break off its attack, possibly
allowing the troopship to proceed to reinforce the Red forces on the islands.
Decision
Given only the information above, is sinking the transport or sinking one of the warships ethically preferable?
• Sinking the transport is clearly ethically preferable.
• Sinking the transport is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Neither action is ethically preferable over the other.
• Sinking one of the warships is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Sinking one of the warships is clearly ethically preferable.

Historical inspiration: Sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, Falklands War,
1982
Model inputs
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COA A

COA B

Number

Intent

Number

Intent

# Enemy civilian casualties

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy utilities destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy cultural sites destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

4,000

0.5

250

0.5

# Friendly civilian casualties

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly utilities destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly cultural sites destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly combatant casualties

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy combatant casualties

Violated principle
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Scenario 5: Last-ditch offensive
p2 Military necessity vs. p4 Prospect of success
Scenario as provided to rater
Last-ditch offensive
Situation
You are a military decision-maker for the nation of Blue, engaged in conflict against
Red.
Blue has been engaged in conventional warfare with Red for six years. Both nations
have suffered great military losses, significant damage to infrastructure, and many
civilian casualties. Red’s military forces, sustained by Red’s greater industrial capacity
and population, have gradually worn down Blue’s capacity to resist. Blue’s economy
has been nearly destroyed, Blue civilians are suffering, and the morale of the Blue
armed forces is very low. Red aircraft attack Blue cities daily and Red ground forces
are deployed on the borders of Blue.
Through careful husbanding of its remaining military resources, Blue has the ability
to launch one final counter-offensive, which is Blue’s only chance of winning the war.
The offensive would likely inflict heavy combatant casualties on Red, but many Blue
combatants would be lost as well, and the offensive has only a small chance of actually
turning the tide of the war and securing a Blue victory. Moreover, the offensive would
likely destroy many Blue utility facilities and cultural sites. Blue’s alternative is to
surrender unconditionally to Red, which would immediately end the bloodshed and
infrastructure damage but leave Blue with an uncertain economic and political future
under Red occupation.
Courses of action
Launch the counter-offensive
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The best estimates available are that launching the Blue offensive will cost 85,000 Blue
combatant casualties, 92,000 Red combatant casualties, and destroy 16 Blue utility
facilities and 8 Blue cultural sites. Even at this cost, the offensive has only a 10%
chance of winning the war for Blue. Because civilians have already largely fled the
combat zone, civilian casualties are expected to be less than 500 in the offensive.
Surrender unconditionally
A Blue surrender will result in no combatant casualties, no civilian casualties, and
no destruction of utility facility or cultural sites. However, Blue will lose its national
sovereignty and be subject to Red occupation for an indefinite period.
Decision
Given only the information above, is launching the counter-offensive or surrendering
ethically preferable?
• Launching the counter-offensive is clearly ethically preferable.
• Launching the counter-offensive is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Neither action is ethically preferable over the other.
• Surrendering is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Surrendering is clearly ethically preferable.

Historical inspiration: The Battle of the Bulge, World War II, 1944–1945
Model inputs
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COA A

COA B

Number

Intent

Number

Intent

# Enemy civilian casualties

0

1.0

0

0.5

# Enemy utilities destroyed

0

1.0

0

0.5

# Enemy cultural sites destroyed

0

1.0

0

0.5

92,000

1.0

0

0.5

# Friendly civilian casualties

500

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly utilities destroyed

16

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly cultural sites destroyed

8

0.5

0

0.5

85,000

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy combatant casualties

# Friendly combatant casualties
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Scenario 6: Merchant ship crew recovery
p3 Proportionality vs. p4 Prospect of success
Scenario as provided to rater
Merchant ship crew recovery
Situation
You are a military decision-maker for the nation of Blue, engaged in conflict against
Red.
Blue and Red are not currently at war, but Red is an ally of a third nation with which
Blue recently fought a long, costly, bitter, and inconclusive conflict. The S.S. Ponce, a
Blue unarmed merchant ship sailing in international waters near the coast of Red, has
just been captured by Red military forces and taken to a harbor on a nearby island
within Red territorial waters. The Ponce has a crew of 287 Blue civilian sailors, who
are believed to be held captive on the island. The entire island is a Red military base;
in addition to the harbor, it has a garrison of 2,500 soldiers, a military airfield with an
unknown number of combat aircraft, and some anti-aircraft defenses.
Blue must choose an action quickly before the crew of the Ponce is taken to the Red
mainland and any military course of action becomes infeasible. As a military decisionmaker for Blue, you must decide which course of action to pursue.
Courses of action
Seize a Red merchant ship and negotiate
Blue may seize and hold a Red merchant vessel, similar in size and complement to the
Ponce, and then enter into negotiations with Red for the mutual release of the ships
and crews.
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The civilian crew of the Red ship is likely to ineffectively resist capture, so seizing the
Red vessel will cost only a few Blue combatant casualties from the capturing force and
Red civilian casualties from the Red ship’s crew. However, there is no certainty that
once the ship is captured the Red leadership will agree to negotiate, and there is a
50% chance Red will respond to the seizure of their ship by summarily executing the
captive crew of the Ponce.
Launch a large military recovery operation
Blue may launch a military operation to recover the Ponce and its crew from the island
where they are held. Such an operation is well within Blue’s military capabilities, but
because the island the Ponce is being held is a military base, the operation will require
a large force and will result in many casualties to both sides.
Blue’s military prowess will ensure the defeat of the Red forces on the island. However,
there will be heavy Red and moderate Blue casualties, in all likelihood many more on
each side than the size of the Ponce’s crew. Moreover, there is a 10% chance that Red
will execute the crew of the Ponce before they can be rescued by Blue forces.
Decision
Given only the information above, is seizing a Red ship or launching a military recovery
operation ethically preferable?
• Seizing a red ship is clearly ethically preferable.
• Seizing a red ship is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Neither action is ethically preferable over the other.
• Launching a military recovery operation is somewhat ethically preferable.
• Launching a military recovery operation is clearly ethically preferable.
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Historical inspiration: SS Mayaguez Incident, Southeast Asia, 1975
Model inputs
COA A

COA B

Number

Intent

Number

Intent

# Enemy civilian casualties

15

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy utilities destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

# Enemy cultural sites destroyed

0

0.5

0

0.5

1,500

0.5

0

0.5

# Friendly civilian casualties

29

0.25

0

0.25

# Friendly utilities destroyed

0

0.25

0

0.25

# Friendly cultural sites destroyed

0

0.25

0

0.25

# Friendly combatant casualties

5

0.25

0

0.25

# Enemy combatant casualties
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APPENDIX B

SURVEY DETAILS

B.1

Optional demographic information requested from raters
Basic demographic information
What is your gender?
• I don’t want to specify
• Male
• Female
What is your age?
• I don’t want to specify
• 20 or younger
• 21 - 30
• 31 - 40
• 41 - 50
• 51 - 60
• 61 - 70
• 71 - 80
• 81 or older
What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
• I don’t want to specify
• Grammar school
• High school/equivalent
• Two-year vocational or technical school
• Some college
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• Bachelor’s degree
• Master’s degree
• Doctoral degree
• Other:
In which field have you obtained your highest degree (if you wish to specify)?
How would you classify yourself?
• I don’t want to specify
• Arab
• Asian/Pacific Islander
• Black
• Caucasian/White
• Hispanic
• Indigenous
• Latino
• Multiracial
• Other
Where do you currently reside?
• I don’t want to specify
• United States
• North America (other)
• South America
• Europe
• Asia
• Australia
How would you describe your occupation—e.g. business administrator,
nurse, engineer (if you wish to specify)?
How many years of experience have you had in this occupation?
• I don’t want to specify
• 0-5
• 5 - 10
• 11 - 15
• 16 - 20
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• 21 - 30
• 31 - 40
• 41 or greater
How would you describe your religious preference (if you wish to specify)?
Information on military service
In which military branch (United States or otherwise) have you had the
most experience?
• I don’t want to specify
• This question does not apply to me
• Army
• Air Force
• Navy
• Marine Corps
• Coast Guard
• Other:
Which best describes your United States (or equivalent) military rank/rate?
• I don’t want to specify
• This question does not apply to me
• Government civilian
• E-1 - E-4
• E-5 - E-6
• E-7 - E-9
• W-1 - W-5
• O-1 - O-3
• O-4 - O-6
• O-7 - O-10
• Other:
Have you had combat experience?
• I don’t want to specify
• No
• Yes, mostly in the following location:
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B.2

Email sent to potential survey respondents
Dear [name],
I am a Ph.D. candidate in the University of Alabama in Huntsville’s Modeling and Simulation degree program. My research involves capturing how
people make ethical decisions, then developing a computer model that may
help with ethical decision-making. My first case study involves the area
of military decision-making, since military decisions have a large impact
on the world around us.
I request your input via a short questionnaire (˜20 minutes). This survey
presents six hypothetical military scenarios, each placing you in a role
where you must make a choice between two different courses of action
based upon the information provided.
The survey is completely anonymous, and we will not use the information
that you provide for purposes outside of this research project.
The survey is located here: https://cmsp.uah.edu/rev/
Please let me know if you have any questions about the questionnaire or
my research.
Regards,
Gregory S. Reed
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Research Engineer, Center for Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis
Ph.D. Candidate, Modeling and Simulation
gregory.reed@uah.edu — 256.602.1236

B.3

Human subjects (IRB) approval letter
Figure B.1 presents the approval letter from the University of Alabama in

Huntsville’s Institutional Review Board, allowing data to be collected from human
subjects via survey website.

B.4

Screenshots from survey website
Following presents various screenshots showcasing the survey website.
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Figure B.1: The approval letter from the UAHuntsville Institutional Review Board

168

Figure B.2: The introductory page displayed to the rater upon visiting the website,
providing background on the project and appropriate contact information
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Figure B.3: An example scenario as presented to the rater. The scenario includes
the situational context, the two courses of action, and an interface for the rater to
select his or her ethical preference between the two.
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Figure B.4: The interface at the end of the “Scenarios and descriptions” page
prompting the rater to select his or her expertise

Figure B.5: A dialog that appears if the rater attempts to proceed (via the “Next”
button) without responding to all scenarios and to the expertise self-classification
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Figure B.6: Additional information displayed for a scenario when the website is
entered in “debug mode”
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Figure B.7: A partial screenshot of the page requesting the rater to provide optional
demographic information
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APPENDIX C

SOURCE CODE FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPED IN THIS
RESEARCH

C.1

Initialize experiment

<?php
// -----------------------------------------------------// Initialize experiment
// -----------------------------------------------------// Connect to MySQL database
mysql_connect("localhost", "greed", "[password]") or die(mysql_error());
mysql_select_db("greed");
// Create experimentation table from human rater responses
mysql_query("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rev_experiment") or die(mysql_error());
mysql_query("CREATE TABLE rev_experiment LIKE rev_responses") or
die(mysql_error());
mysql_query("INSERT IGNORE rev_experiment SELECT * FROM rev_responses")
or die(mysql_error());
// Generate random raters
for ($i=0; $i<1000; $i++)
{
$id=md5(rand());
$id[0]="R";
$query=("INSERT INTO rev_experiment(userId, rPreferredActionScenario1,
rPreferredActionScenario2, rPreferredActionScenario3,
rPreferredActionScenario4, rPreferredActionScenario5,
rPreferredActionScenario6, rClass) VALUES(’".$id."’,".rand(-2,2).
",".rand(-2,2).",".rand(-2,2).",".rand(-2,2).",".rand(-2,2).",".
rand(-2,2).",’random’)");
mysql_query($query) or die(mysql_error());
}
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// Generate Metric based upon precalculated responses
$query=("INSERT INTO rev_experiment(userId, rPreferredActionScenario1,
rPreferredActionScenario2, rPreferredActionScenario3,
rPreferredActionScenario4, rPreferredActionScenario5,
rPreferredActionScenario6, rClass) VALUES(’Metric, recalibrated’,
-1,1,1,1,2,0,’Metric, recalibrated’)");
mysql_query($query) or die(mysql_error());
// Generate custom variant of the REV (if command line arguments specified)
if ($argv[1]!=null)
formulateREV($argv[1], $argv[2], $argv[3], $argv[4], "custom
(".$argv[1].", ".$argv[2].", ".$argv[3].", ".$argv[4].")");
// Generate other variants of the REV
formulateREV(1, .65, .25, 0, "calibrated");
formulateREV(1, 1, 1, 1, "all weights equal");
formulateREV(1, 0, 0, 0, "dominant \$p_1\$");

//
//

// -----------------------------------------------------// Formulate an instance of the REV and place it in the experiment table.
// Calculate scenario responses from weights, then insert REV as a rater.
function formulateREV($w1, $w2, $w3, $w4, $identifier)
{
$rev2_1=($w1-$w2)*2;
$rev2_2=($w1-$w3)*2;
$rev2_3=($w1-$w4)*2;
$rev2_4=($w2-$w3)*2;
$rev2_5=($w2-$w4)*2;
$rev2_6=($w3-$w4)*2;
print "\nREV\n\tWeights for p:\t$w1\t$w2\t$w3\t$w4\n\tResponses:\t
$rev2_1\t$rev2_2\t$rev2_3\t$rev2_4\t$rev2_5\t$rev2_6\n";
print "\tAs entered:\t".round($rev2_1)."\t".round($rev2_2)."\t".
round($rev2_3)."\t".round($rev2_4)."\t".round($rev2_5)."\t".
round($rev2_6)."\n";
$query=("INSERT INTO rev_experiment(userId, rPreferredActionScenario1,
rPreferredActionScenario2, rPreferredActionScenario3,
rPreferredActionScenario4, rPreferredActionScenario5,
rPreferredActionScenario6, rClass) VALUES(’REV, $identifier’,
$rev2_1,$rev2_2,$rev2_3,$rev2_4,$rev2_5,$rev2_6,’REV,
$identifier’)");
mysql_query($query) or die(mysql_error());
}

?>

C.2

Run experiment

<?php
// ------------------------------------------------------
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// Run experiment
// -----------------------------------------------------// Connect to MySQL database
mysql_connect("localhost", "greed", "[password]") or die(mysql_error());
mysql_select_db("greed");
// Gather all raters’ information into PHP array
$ratersDBList=mysql_query("SELECT *, rPreferredActionScenario1+
rPreferredActionScenario2+ rPreferredActionScenario3 AS p1,
-rPreferredActionScenario1+rPreferredActionScenario4
+rPreferredActionScenario5 AS p2, -rPreferredActionScenario3
-rPreferredActionScenario4+rPreferredActionScenario6 AS p3,
-rPreferredActionScenario3-rPreferredActionScenario5
-rPreferredActionScenario6 AS p4
FROM rev_experiment ORDER BY RAND()") or die(mysql_error());
while ($raterRow=mysql_fetch_array($ratersDBList, MYSQL_ASSOC))
{
if ($raterRow["rClass"]!="")
{
$raters[substr($raterRow["rClass"],0,3)."_".sprintf("%03d", ++$i)]
=$raterRow;
$numRaters[$raterRow["rClass"]]++;
}
}
print "\nNumber of raters per class:\n";
arsort($numRaters);
foreach($numRaters as $class=>$number)
print "\t#".substr($class,0,6)."\t$number\n";
// Create other relevant arrays for classes
$contestants=$raters;
// Create initial Standards array
foreach ($contestants as $key => $contestant)
{
if ($contestant["rClass"]=="humanities" || $contestant["rClass"]==
"military")
$standards[$key]=$contestant;
}
// Move some from Standards to Testing
$i=0;
// Determine number of Testing
// If >60, split in half. ?
if (count($standards)>60)
$numNontesting=count($standards)/2;
// If >30, need 30 for statistical significance
else if (count($standards)>30)
$numNontesting=count($standards)-30;
// Otherwise, simply split in half
else
$numNontesting=count($standards)/2;
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foreach ($standards as $key => $standard)
{
if ($i++>=$numNontesting)
break;
$testing[$key]=$standard;
unset($contestants[$key]);
}

// Calculate statistic for each contestant
// Fields to compare (normally, all scenarios)
$fieldsToCompare=array("rPreferredActionScenario1",
"rPreferredActionScenario2", "rPreferredActionScenario3",
"rPreferredActionScenario4", "rPreferredActionScenario5",
"rPreferredActionScenario6");
// For each contestant...
foreach ($contestants as $cKey=>$contestant)
{
// For each tester...
foreach ($testing as $tKey=>$tester)
{
// Do not test a rater against himself
if ($tKey!=$cKey)
// For each field (scenario)...
foreach ($fieldsToCompare as $field)
{
// Compare by signs
$cS=($contestant[$field]>0 ? 1 :
($contestant[$field]<0 ? -1 : 0));
$tS=($tester[$field]>0 ? 1 : ($tester[$field]<0 ? -1 :
0));
if ($tS==$cS)
$contestants[$cKey]["concordant"]++;
else
$contestants[$cKey]["discordant"]++;
$contestants[$cKey]["numComparisons"]++;
}
}
// Calculate statistic (gamma)
$contestants[$cKey]["stat"]=
($contestants[$cKey]["concordant"]$contestants[$cKey]["discordant"])/
($contestants[$cKey]["concordant"]+
$contestants[$cKey]["discordant"]);
}
// Display results
foreach ($contestants as $key=>$row)
$classes[]=$row["rClass"];
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foreach(array_unique($classes) as $class)
{
foreach ($contestants as $key=>$row)
if ($row["rClass"]==$class)
{
$totalStat[$class]+=$row["stat"];
$numIn[$class]++;
}
$averageFor[$class]=$totalStat[$class]/$numIn[$class];
}
print "\nAverage per class:\n";
arsort($averageFor);
foreach($averageFor as $class=>$average)
print "\t".substr($class,0,6)."\t".substr($average,0,10) ."
(".$numIn[$class].")\n";
// Summary
print "\n".count($standards)." Standards, of which ".count($testing)."
were set aside as Testers. ".count($contestants)." Contestants
competed overall.";
// Testing
print "\n\nTesting raters:\n";
print "\t\t\t\tS1\tS2\tS3\tS4\tS5\tS6\tc\td\tn\tstat\n";
foreach ($testing as $cKey=>$c)
print "\t\t$cKey.\t".$c["rPreferredActionScenario1"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario2"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario3"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario4"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario5"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario6"]."\t".
$c["concordant"]."\t".$c["discordant"]."\t".
$c["numComparisons"]."\t".$c["stat"]."\n";
// Sort contestants by stat (gamma)
foreach ($contestants as $key=>$row)
$stat[$key]=$row["stat"];
array_multisort($stat, SORT_DESC, $contestants);
$i=0;
print "\n\nContestants:\n";
print "\t\t\t\tS1\tS2\tS3\tS4\tS5\tS6\tc\td\tn\tstat\n";
foreach ($contestants as $cKey=>$c)
{
$i++;
print "\t$i.\t".$c["userId"]."\t".$c["rClass"]."\t$cKey\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario1"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario2"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario3"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario4"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario5"]."\t".
$c["rPreferredActionScenario6"]."\t".
$c["concordant"]."\t".$c["discordant"]."\t".
$c["numComparisons"]."\t".$c["stat"]."\n";
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}
?>

C.3

Analyze classes using overarching application

<?php
// -----------------------------------------------------// Backbone application
// -----------------------------------------------------// Get number of runs to perform from command line
$numRuns=$argv[1];
// Initialize the experiment, optionally with a custom set of REV principle
weights as specified on command line.
exec("php initializeExperiment.php " . $argv[2] . " " . $argv[3] . " " .
$argv[4] . " " . $argv[5]);

// Gather statistics for each rater.
// Execute a single run...
print "\n\n\n\nName\tAverage\tStd. Dev\t# Comparisons\t# Raters\n";
for ($i=0; $i<$numRuns; $i++)
{
$output="";
// Run the program that collects stats for each rater
exec("php runOnce.php", $output);
// Extract result for each rater and place in appropriate class
foreach ($output as $line)
if (preg_match("/\t[0-9]+\.\t(.*?)\t(.*?)\t.*?\t([\-0-9\.+]*)$/",
$line,$match))
{
if ($match[2]=="humanities")
{
$class["Humanities experts"]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class["Humanities experts"]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
if ($match[2]=="military")
{
$class["Military experts"]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class["Military experts"]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
if ($match[2]=="non-expert")
{
$class["Non-experts"]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class["Non-experts"]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
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if ($match[2]=="humanities" || $match[2]=="military")
{
$class["All experts"]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class["All experts"]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
if ($match[2]=="humanities" || $match[2]=="military" ||
$match[2]=="non-expert")
{
$class["All people"]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class["All people"]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
if ($match[2]=="random")
{
$class["Random"]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class["Random"]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
if (preg_match("(Metric|REV)",$match[2]))
{
$class[$match[2]]["comparisons"][]=$match[3];
$class[$match[2]]["raters"][$match[1]]=1;
}
$raterGammas[$match[1]][]=$match[3];
$classes[$match[1]]=$match[2];
}
}
// ... then, calculate class statistics.
foreach ($class as $classname=>$information)
{
// Gather relevant information for display
$averageStat=(array_sum($information["comparisons"])/
count($information["comparisons"]));
$numComparisons=count($information["comparisons"]);
$stdDev=standard_deviation($information["comparisons"]);
$numRaters=count($information["raters"]);
// Print information, properly formatted. a is for ***
print $classname . " &a & " . $numRaters. " &a & " . $numComparisons.
" &a & ".$averageStat . " &a & " . $stdDev . " & \\\\ \n";
}
// Print overall results
print "Rater ID\tClass\tGamma\tStd.Dev\tComparisons\n";
$i=0;
foreach ($raterGammas as $rater=>$gammas)
{
$i++;
$averageStat=array_sum($gammas)/count($gammas);
$numComparisons=count($gammas);
$stdDev=standard_deviation($gammas);
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print "$i \t $rater \t".$classes[$rater]." \t$averageStat\t$stdDev\t
$numComparisons\t\\\\\n";
}
// -----------------------------------------------------// Calculate standard deviation
function standard_deviation($values)
{
$mean=array_sum($values)/count($values);
foreach($values as $value)
$variance+=pow($value-$mean, 2);
$variance/=(count($values)-1);
return sqrt($variance);
}
?>
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APPENDIX D

AVERAGE Γ VALUES FOR HUMAN AND MODEL RATERS

Table D.1: Γ̄ values for all non-random raters used in the primary experiment

Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

11

Non-expert

-0.0650

17

REV, calibrated

-0.0650

5

Humanities

-0.0763

6

Military

-0.0772

7

Military

-0.0777

16

Humanities

-0.0787

34

Military

-0.0887

114

Non-expert

-0.1002

19

Non-expert

-0.1066

248

Non-expert

-0.1067

249

Non-expert

-0.1067

74

Non-expert

-0.1113
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Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

33

Humanities

-0.1162

18

Humanities

-0.1163

282

Non-expert

-0.1189

1104

Humanities

-0.1197

20

Humanities

-0.1208

73

Military

-0.1270

281

Humanities

-0.1289

113

Non-expert

-0.1386

Military

-0.1406

55

Non-expert

-0.1408

1121

Humanities

-0.1412

Military

-0.1444

1130

Humanities

-0.1504

140

Non-expert

-0.1507

406

Military

-0.1527

1144

Humanities

-0.1528

1122

Military

-0.1530

Non-expert

-0.1530

Military

-0.1532

1137

139

318
1106
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Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

1129

Humanities

-0.1537

475

Non-expert

-0.1541

439

Military

-0.1550

175

Military

-0.1602

1131

Humanities

-0.1612

87

Non-expert

-0.1620

Military

-0.1674

88

Non-expert

-0.1680

345

Non-expert

-0.1695

250

Non-expert

-0.1703

1145

Humanities

-0.1756

115

Non-expert

-0.1802

1109

Humanities

-0.1845

1107

Military

-0.1856

314

Non-expert

-0.1859

441

Military

-0.1861

472

Humanities

-0.1917

1143

Military

-0.1923

1133

Military

-0.1957

316
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Rater ID
1140

Class

Γ̄

Military

-0.1965

Humanities

-0.1996

Military

-0.1997

227

Non-expert

-0.2032

405

Non-expert

-0.2063

401

Non-expert

-0.2097

Military

-0.2116

Non-expert

-0.2154

Military

-0.2176

474

Non-expert

-0.2177

591

Non-expert

-0.2245

1105

Military

-0.2247

1125

Humanities

-0.2249

556

Non-expert

-0.2265

663

Military

-0.2286

Humanities

-0.2296

476

Military

-0.2297

1124

Military

-0.2306

Non-expert

-0.2318

315
1132

98
660
1111

1112

112
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Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

370

Non-expert

-0.2320

317

Military

-0.2330

473

Military

-0.2354

251

Non-expert

-0.2374

1108

Military

-0.2395

1113

Military

-0.2406

555

Non-expert

-0.2430

346

Non-expert

-0.2442

347

Metric, recalibrated

-0.2442

1123

Humanities

-0.2488

781

Non-expert

-0.2517

782

Non-expert

-0.2517

443

Military

-0.2559

403

Military

-0.2581

785

Non-expert

-0.2583

Military

-0.2586

823

Non-expert

-0.2597

736

Humanities

-0.2604

440

Non-expert

-0.2606

1110

Continued on next page

186

Table D.1 — continued from previous page
Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

471

Military

-0.2613

780

Non-expert

-0.2617

442

Non-expert

-0.2686

517

Humanities

-0.2689

515

Military

-0.2709

404

Humanities

-0.2726

1114

Humanities

-0.2755

12

Humanities

-0.2813

592

Non-expert

-0.2822

822

Non-expert

-0.2858

402

Military

-0.2867

1135

Military

-0.2878

Non-expert

-0.2883

1126

Military

-0.2922

661

Military

-0.2953

783

Military

-0.3014

826

Military

-0.3071

1141

Military

-0.3072

Non-expert

-0.3094

369

821
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Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

918

Non-expert

-0.3096

368

Military

-0.3118

1138

Humanities

-0.3120

662

Non-expert

-0.3176

686

Non-expert

-0.3177

516

Humanities

-0.3209

664

Humanities

-0.3252

518

Military

-0.3258

824

Humanities

-0.3305

784

Non-expert

-0.3317

975

Non-expert

-0.3318

1127

Humanities

-0.3321

947

Military

-0.3336

825

Military

-0.3357

1139

Military

-0.3379

1116

Military

-0.3440

1115

Military

-0.3535

1134

Military

-0.3775

Non-expert

-0.3778

946

Continued on next page
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Rater ID

Class

Γ̄

590

Military

-0.3783

986

REV, dominant p1

-0.3783

995

Non-expert

-0.3793

1037

Non-expert

-0.3814

1136

Humanities

-0.4017

1117

Military

-0.4133

1058

Non-expert

-0.4135

1047

Non-expert

-0.4169

1142

Humanities

-0.4361

1128

Humanities

-0.4775

1118

Military

-0.5676

1098

Non-expert

-0.5739

1119

Humanities

-0.5931

1097

Humanities

-0.5933

1099

REV, all weights equal

-0.6438

1100

Non-expert

-0.6438

1101

Non-expert

-0.6438

1102

Non-expert

-0.6438

1120

Humanities

-0.6621
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